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POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY,  
JUDICIAL SUPREMACY, AND THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION: WHY THE 
JUDICIARY CANNOT BE THE FINAL 
ARBITER OF CONSTITUTIONS 
WILLIAM J. WATKINS, JR.* 
he development of constitutional government in Great Britain 
and America is inseparable from the debate and the conflict over 
sovereignty.  In Britain, parliamentary sovereignty triumphed over 
the divine right of kings to form the foundation of British liberty.  In 
America, popular sovereignty triumphed over parliamentary/ 
legislative sovereignty to render government the servant of the 
people.  Without acceptance of popular sovereignty, judicial review 
would likely be unknown in the United States.1  Under 
parliamentary/legislative sovereignty, the legislative body exercises 
ultimate authority over statutory law and fundamental law.  The 
legislature can make or repeal law as it sees fit.  With the exception of 
revolution, neither the judiciary, nor the executive, nor the people 
can override the legislature’s will. 
Under popular sovereignty, the executive, legislative, and 
judiciary are mere agents of the people and the people’s constitution.  
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 1. Judicial review is the “[p]ower of courts to review decisions of another department or 
level of government.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 849 (6th ed. 1990). 
T 
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In performing their constitutional functions, the branches must 
interpret the constitution to ensure that their actions conform to the 
instrument.  In the judicial context, a court must compare a statute in 
controversy with the text of the constitution before giving effect to 
the statute.  For example, if a constitution secures the right to trial by 
jury in all civil actions where the amount in controversy exceeds $100 
and the legislature passes a statute increasing the jurisdictional 
amount to $500, a non-jury verdict for $400 would be void if one of 
the litigants had demanded a jury trial.  The judiciary would be 
bound to declare such a judgment a nullity on the grounds that an 
act of the legislature cannot alter the people’s fundamental law. 
Although judicial review naturally flows from principles of 
popular sovereignty, judicial supremacy does not.  Judicial 
supremacy, as framed by the United States Supreme Court in Cooper 
v. Aaron, provides that “the federal judiciary is supreme in the 
exposition of the law of the Constitution.”2  Once the judiciary 
interprets a constitutional provision, neither the executive nor 
legislature can offer a competing interpretation in the performance of 
their constitutional duties.  The matter is settled because the judiciary 
has spoken. 
This Article shows that Americans of the founding generation 
understood judicial review not as a counterweight against popular 
government, but as a consequence of popular sovereignty and, 
indeed, as a support of it.  The original understanding of judicial 
review not only differs from the doctrine of judicial supremacy later 
embraced by the modern Supreme Court in decisions like Cooper v. 
 
 2. 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958); see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (describing the 
Court as the “ultimate interpreter of the Constitution”). 
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Aaron, but is actually incompatible with the modern conception of 
judicial supremacy. 
Section One of this Article traces the defeat of divine right theory 
in England and the emergence of parliamentary sovereignty.  Section 
Two considers the American colonists’ rejection of parliamentary 
sovereignty during the Revolution and their establishment of popular 
sovereignty as the cardinal principle of American constitutionalism.  
Section Three studies English precedent often cited as the basis for 
the American doctrine of judicial review, and shows that these 
English cases, as simple exercises in statutory construction, cannot be 
classified as precursors to American judicial review.  Section Four 
examines the development of judicial review in American state 
courts both prior to and after ratification of the United States 
Constitution.  This final section also examines Marbury v. Madison 
in the context of these early state court decisions and concludes that 
Chief Justice Marshall never contemplated establishing the Supreme 
Court as the final arbiter of our Constitution. A believer in popular 
sovereignty, Marshall would not have reverted to British practice 
whereby a branch of government has total control over fundamental 
law.  Instead, the Marbury opinion—like the state decisions before 
it—simply recognized that the judiciary is a co-equal branch of 
government empowered to interpret the Constitution along with the 
president and Congress. 
I 
THE STRUGGLE OVER SOVEREIGNTY IN STUART ENGLAND 
The acceptance of popular sovereignty in the United States 
cannot be understood outside the context of English history and the 
conflict between the Crown and Parliament.  The English Civil War 
and Glorious Revolution set the stage for the American Revolution 
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and radical ideas about the power of the people.  Principles of 
popular sovereignty were first seriously debated during the 1640s in 
England.  With the defeat of royalist forces and the execution of the 
king, Englishmen examined the tenets of monarchical and republican 
theory.  But for the instability of the Interregnum, theorists and 
soldiers arguing for popular sovereignty could have taken a 
tremendous leap forward in the realm of political science.  Although 
unsuccessful in England, these heterodox theorists put forward ideas 
that seventy years later would take hold in America. 
A. The Influence of Jean Bodin 
Sovereignty is the supreme power of governance.3  Any 
discussion of sovereignty should begin with Jean Bodin’s République, 
which was first published in 1576.4  This book is the earliest known 
comprehensive discussion of the doctrine of sovereignty.5  In 
République, Bodin began with the proposition that a ruler “is 
absolutely sovereign who recognizes nothing, after God, that is 
greater than himself.”6  Sovereign princes were, in Bodin’s words, 
God’s “lieutenants for commanding other men;” therefore, 
“[c]ontempt for one’s sovereign prince is contempt toward God, of 
whom he is the earthly image.”7  For Bodin, there were seven 
prerogatives of sovereignty: (1) declaring war and peace, (2) hearing 
appeals from inferior officials, (3) removing and appointing 
 
 3. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1396 (6th ed. 1990) (describing sovereignty as “[t]he 
supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power by which any independent state is governed”). 
 4. The version I rely on here contains four translated chapters from the original work.  JEAN 
BODIN, ON SOVEREIGNTY (Julian H. Franklin ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1992) (1576). 
 5. See JEFFREY GOLDSWORTHY, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF PARLIAMENT 17 (1999) (describing 
Bodin as “the founder of modern theories of legislative sovereignty”). 
 6. BODIN, supra note 4, at 4. 
 7. Id. at 46. 
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government functionaries, (4) imposing taxes, (5) granting pardons, 
(6) coining money, and (7) requiring subjects to swear loyalty oaths.8 
Importantly, Bodin believed that the prerogatives of sovereign 
power were “indivisible.”9  Only one entity could exercise the seven 
prerogatives.  Otherwise, the supposed co-sovereigns would clash 
until one prevailed as the ultimate sovereign.  Bodin did recognize 
that the sovereign entity could be one man (a monarchy), a few elite 
(an aristocracy), or the entire population (a democracy).10  But, the 
tenor of his work is geared toward that of a monarchy—the system 
with which he and his contemporaries were most familiar. 
Although Bodin spoke of absolute sovereignty, he believed that 
natural law placed certain limits on the sovereign’s power.11  Precise 
natural law principles are difficult to define, but Bodin claimed that 
at a minimum, the natural law required a sovereign to respect the 
property of his people.  According to Bodin, “[i]f the prince, then, 
does not have the power to overstep the bounds of natural law, which 
has been established by God, of whom he is the image, he will also 
not be able to take another’s property without just and reasonable 
 
 8. Id. at 58–59. 
 9. Id. at 104. 
 10. Id. at 89. 
 11. See id. at 13 (“But as for divine and natural laws, every prince on earth is subject to them, 
and it is not in their power to contravene them unless they wish to be guilty of treason against 
God.”).  Natural law is a difficult term to define.  Perhaps one of the best descriptions comes from 
Peter J. Stanlis: 
Natural Law was an emanation of God’s reason and will, revealed to all mankind. Since 
fundamental moral laws were self-evident, all normal men were capable through 
unaided “right reason” of perceiving the difference between moral right and wrong.  
The natural law was an eternal, unchangeable, and universal ethical norm or standard, 
whose validity was independent of man’s will; therefore, at all times, in all 
circumstances and everywhere it bound all individuals, races, nations, and 
governments. 
PETER J. STANLIS, EDMUND BURKE AND THE NATURAL LAW 7, 251–54 (1986). 
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cause—as by purchase, exchange, lawful confiscation.”12  If the king 
did violate the natural law by wrongfully depriving a subject of his 
property, the only remedy was a polite remonstrance.  The real 
wrong, in Bodin’s mind, was to God.  Thus, the subject was 
forbidden to resist the sovereign prince in cases where natural law 
had been violated.13 
Bodin’s thinking about sovereignty provides a backdrop for 
discussions between the Stuart monarchs and Parliament about the 
locus of sovereignty in the English system.  They both saw 
sovereignty as indivisible, but they differed on its location.  The 
Stuarts claimed that sovereignty resided in the king’s royal person 
whereas Parliament contended that the king was only sovereign 
when working in conjunction with Parliament. The king especially 
agreed with Bodin’s description of the prince as God’s lieutenant on 
earth and the concomitant inability of Parliament or the people to 
punish him for violation of positive or natural law.  In the end, 
Englishmen rejected this royal immunity because of the Crown’s 
abuse of power. 
B. The Stuart Monarchs and the Divine Right of Kings 
James I is the English monarch most closely associated with the 
divine right theory.14 Philosophically, James was a monarch cut from 
the Bodin mold.15 Although ignorant of England and its system of 
 
 12. BODIN, supra note 4, at 39. 
 13. See id. at 46 (“Contempt for one’s sovereign prince is contempt toward God, of whom he 
is the earthly image.  That is why God, speaking to Samuel, from whom the people had demanded 
a different prince, said ‘It is me that they have wronged.’”). 
 14. For a recent biography of James, see generally PAULINE CROFT, KING JAMES (2003).  For 
a brief discussion of James’s rise to power and rule, see generally 2 WINSTON CHURCHILL, A 
HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH SPEAKING PEOPLES: THE NEW WORLD 119–31 (1956). 
 15. For the influence of Bodin on James I, see Harold Berman, The Origins of Historical 
Jurisprudence, 103 YALE L.J. 1651, 1667–73 (1994). 
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government, James was well versed in the divine right of kings16 and 
expected total obedience from his subjects.17  He saw the realm as one 
great chain of being18 in which he occupied a spot just under God.  
James’s brand of divine right consisted of four elements: 
indefeasibility of hereditary right, accountability of kings to God 
alone, non-resistance of subjects, and divine ordination of monarchy 
as a governing institution.19 
The English clergy were instrumental in helping James spread 
this message to the people.  Considering that under the Act of 
Supremacy in 1534,20 the king was the head of the Church in 
England, such propaganda from the pulpit is not surprising.21  A 
prime example of this is a sermon preached by William Goodwin in 
1614.  “Who can lay his hand upon God’s annointed,” asked 
Goodwin, “and be innocent?  Who can?  No man, [b]ecause God 
hath planted him above all men, and hath given no man authority to 
punish Him; God alone will take vengeance on his sinnes.”22  
Goodwin recognized that a monarch could be cruel to his people.  
 
 16. See J.P. SUMMERVILLE, POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY IN ENGLAND 1603–1640, at 9 (1986) 
(discussing divine right of kings). 
 17. James’s theory “was by no means new to England but for some seventy years had been 
implicit, and often explicit, in the language of supporters of the Tudor monarchy.”  Berman, supra 
note 15, at 1673. 
 18. SIR THOMAS SMITH, DE REPUBLICA ANGLORUM (1583), reprinted in SOURCES AND 
DEBATES IN ENGLISH HISTORY: 1485–1714, at 7 (Newton Key & Robert Bucholz eds., 2004). 
 19. Joyce Lee Malcolm, Introduction to 1 THE STRUGGLE FOR SOVEREIGNTY: SEVENTEENTH 
CENTURY POLITICAL TRACTS xxxv–xxxvi (Joyce Lee Malcolm ed., 1999) [hereinafter STRUGGLE 
FOR SOVEREIGNTY]. 
 20. R.R. PALMER & JOEL COLTON, A HISTORY OF THE MODERN WORLD 79 (1978). 
 21. Summerville has gone so far as to describe the church as “the king’s ministry of 
propaganda.”  SUMMERVILLE, supra note 16, at 10. 
 22. William Goodwin, A Sermon Preached Before the Kings Most Excellent Maiestie at 
Woodstoke (1614), reprinted in 1 STRUGGLE FOR SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 19, at 38 (emphasis 
omitted). 
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God, however, preferred order to rebellion and thus prohibited any 
kind of revolutionary act: 
God, which is the God of order, & not of confusion, foresaw in 
his wisdome, that it were better for the estates of Kingdomes, & 
lesse injurious to his Church, if the insolency of a wicked King, 
were sometimes tolerated without controll, than that the estate of 
his chiefe deputy, and Lieutenant upon the earth should be 
subjected to change and alteration, to deprivation, or deposing, at 
the pleasure and partialitie of either Priest, or of People.23 
Roger Maynwaring further advised the people that suffering would 
make them “martyars,” whereas civil disobedience would make them 
“traitors” in the eyes of God and subject to eternal damnation.24 
With regard to Parliament as an institution, the royalists believed 
that Parliament was not a necessary ingredient for the realm’s 
governance.  In 1626, Sir Dudley Carleton warned Englishmen that 
the king could easily fall “out of love with parliaments” and “be 
enforced to use new counsels” in governing the kingdom.25  At this 
time in English history, the king had much control over Parliament: 
He decided when it should convene and disperse, and no statute 
could pass without his consent. 
While the king asserted that he “was beholden to no elective 
power,”26 Parliament had significant control over the purse strings 
and ordinary legislation.  As early as the fourteenth century, English 
 
 23. Id. at 41–42 (emphasis omitted). 
 24. ROGER MAYNWARING, RELIGION AND ALEGIANCE (1627), reprinted in 1 STRUGGLE FOR 
SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 19, at 64. James I went so far as to call himself a “god.”  “Kings are justly 
called gods for that they exercise a manner or resemblance of divine power upon earth, for if you 
will consider the attributes to God you shall see how they agree in the person of a king.” James I, 
Speech to Parliament (1610), in THE STUART CONSTITUTION 1603–1688: DOCUMENTS AND 
COMMENTARY 11, 12 (J.P. Kenyon ed., 1986) [hereinafter THE STUART CONSTITUTION]. 
 25. Dudley Carleton, Speech to the House of Commons (1626), in THE STUART 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 24, at 45. 
 26. The Earl of Salisbury, Speech to Parliament (1610), in THE STUART CONSTITUTION, supra 
note 24, at 11. 
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kings had agreed that no tallage or aid would be levied without the 
consent of the freeman of the realm.27  Hence, actual practice differed 
somewhat from royalist theory. 
In contrast to the royalists, parliamentarians emphasized the 
doctrine of king-in-parliament.  “[F]or in acts of parliament, be they 
laws, grounds, or whatsoever else,” observed MP James Whitelocke 
in 1610, “the act and power is the king’s but with the assent of the 
Lords and Commons, which maketh it the most sovereign and 
supreme power above all and controllable by none.”28  Under 
parliamentarian theory, the king, Lords, and Commons together in 
one house were omni-competent.  God had conferred the power of 
governance on the entire community, and this community, in turn, 
delegated powers to the king “subject to the conditions that he make 
laws and impose taxes only in Parliament.”29  In other words, the 
Lords and Commons were the king’s partners in governance of the 
realm 
English history is replete with challenges to royal power, but the 
struggles between the Stuarts and their parliaments would become an 
all-or-nothing affair.  Much of this tension was caused by events on 
the Continent, where European monarchs were limiting the power of 
(and in some cases eliminating) representative assemblies.30  
Desperately short of funds because of extravagance at court and 
inefficiency in government administration,31 James frightened many 
 
 27. DONALD W. HANSON, FROM KINGDOM TO COMMONWEALTH 156 (1970). 
 28. James Whitelocke, Speech on Impositions (1610), in THE STUART CONSTITUTION, supra 
note 24, at 60, 61. 
 29. GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 5, at 96. 
 30. BARRY COWARD, THE STUART AGE 110 (1994). 
 31. See LACEY BALDWIN SMITH, THE REALM OF ENGLAND 205 (1983) (describing James I as 
“unskilled in the craft of running a centralized, semi-institutionalized and efficient bureaucracy.  
He saw crown offices primarily as means of rewarding good friends and only secondarily as 
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of the Commons by resorting to schemes for extra-parliamentary 
revenue.  The selling of titles, forced loans, increases in the customs 
duties, and more frequent use of patents and monopolies brought 
additional monies into the king’s coffers.32  The monarch’s reliance 
on Parliament for money had always been critical to the growth and 
maintenance of parliamentary power.  Hence, James’s efforts seemed 
to threaten the very existence of Parliament. 
Tensions between the parliamentarians and royalists during 
James’s reign were very real, but they were also manageable.  Once 
Charles I assumed the throne in 1625, the divide between the 
competing camps grew to such an extent that civil war was inevitable.  
Unlike his father, Charles involved England in foreign wars with 
France and Spain.  The wars caused the Crown’s finances to become 
more impecunious, which in turn caused Charles to exercise his so-
called emergency prerogative powers to raise revenue.33 Rejecting 
Parliament’s demands, the king responded that “[t]he good of 
monarchy is the uniting a nation under one head to resist invasion 
from abroad and insurrection at home.”34  He further insisted that 
under the laws of the realm “the government . . . is [en]trusted to the 
king.”35  Within a few short months, the English Civil War would 
begin. 
 
positions of administrative responsibility . . . [and] surrounded himself with Scottish cronies, 
charming young men, and worthless Englishmen”). 
 32. COWARD, supra note 30, at 152. 
 33. The greatest controversy was perhaps the King’s levying of Tunnage and Poundage, 
which Parliaments typically granted for the life of the king.  In the case of Charles, Parliament 
granted these taxes on wine and other commodities for only one year.  SMITH, supra note 31, at 
217–22. 
 34. Charles I, The King’s Answer to the Nineteen Propositions (1642), in THE STUART 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 24, at 18. 
 35. Id. 
03__WATKINS.DOC 11/1/2007  3:37:21 PM 
 
VOL. 1 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW &   PUBLIC POLICY 2006 
 
? 169 ? 
C. The English Civil War and Political Heterodoxy 
Battle soon proved that royal forces were no match for 
Parliament’s New Model Army (“NMA”) under the leadership of 
Thomas Fairfax and Oliver Cromwell.  Unlike past armies, success in 
the NMA was based on merit rather than bloodlines.  So effective was 
the NMA that by 1646, Charles surrendered to Scottish authorities, 
and by 1649, he was executed.  The NMA was more than just a 
fighting force; it also had a political agenda.  In Putney, the NMA set 
up a debating society where men elected from the various regiments 
discussed the proper framework and foundation of a just society.  
With the collapse of the old order, the soldiers as well as civilians 
were free to put forward heterodox opinions representing viewpoints 
from across the political spectrum.  On the extreme left were the 
“Diggers,” a group advocating the abolishment of private property 
and the creation of a communistic state.36  More conservative 
elements favored establishment of some sort of limited monarchy.  
Others argued that a new government should be grounded in 
republican principles. 
Although unsuccessful, there was a sizeable movement that 
advocated revolutionary principles of popular sovereignty.  Up until 
this point in English history, there were primarily two competing 
views of ultimate sovereignty.  Royalists argued that ultimate 
sovereignty resided in the king, and parliamentarians argued that it 
resided with the king-in-parliament.  With the king dead, claims 
arose in the late 1640s that the NMA was sovereign and an 
expression of the people’s will.  In other words, the NMA was the 
people.37 
 
 36. CHURCHILL, supra note 14, at 228. 
 37. EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE 78–79 (1988). 
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A group within the NMA known as the “Levellers,”38 however, 
developed the novel idea that ultimate authority resided in the people 
themselves.  Institutions of government, under the Leveller theory, 
were but agents of the people and could only exercise delegated 
powers with the consent of the people.  In the words of Leveller 
leader John Lilburne, it was “tyrannical” for any person to “assume 
unto himself a power, authority and jurisdiction, to rule, govern or 
reign over any sort of men in the world without their free consent . . . 
.”39  And, according to another Leveller, Richard Orton, if ever the 
people’s agents exceeded the delegated powers, all power “returneth 
from whence it came, even to the hands of the [people].”40 
To put theory into practice, the Levellers created the Agreement 
of the People, which would have required the signature of all citizens 
before it became effective.  In essence, this was a written constitution 
whereby the people, as ultimate sovereigns, delegated certain powers 
to their representatives. 
That the power of this, and all future Representatives of this 
nation is inferior only to theirs who choose them, and doth 
extend, without the consent or concurrence of any other person 
or persons, to the enacting, altering, and repealing of laws; to the 
erecting and abolishing of offices and courts; to the appointing, 
removing, and calling to account magistrates and officers of all 
degrees; to the making of war and peace; to the treating with 
 
 38. For a discussion of the views of the Levellers and their transformation into a civilian 
reform group, see G.P. GOOCH, ENGLISH DEMOCRATIC IDEAS IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 
118–34 (1954). 
 39. JOHN LILBURNE, THE FREE-MAN’S FREEDOM VINDICATED (1646), reprinted in 
PURITANISM AND LIBERTY: BEING THE ARMY DEBATES (1647–9), at 317, 317 (A.S.P. Woodhouse 
ed., 2d ed. 1950) [hereinafter PURITANISM AND LIBERTY]. 
 40. RICHARD OVERTON, AN APPEAL FROM THE COMMONS TO THE FREE PEOPLE (1647), 
reprinted in PURITANISM AND LIBERTY, supra note 39, at 323, 327. 
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foreign states; and generally to whatsoever is not expressly or 
impliedly reserved by the represented to themselves.41 
There then followed a reservation of rights that prohibited the 
representatives from doing such things as interfering with religion or 
conscripting citizens.42  The ideas of the Levellers were radical and 
ahead of their time.  Unfortunately, the Agreement of the People was 
rejected by the dominant political powers, and Leveller leaders were 
charged with sedition.  The essence of Leveller theory would not be 
embraced until the next century when a people emerging from their 
own revolution had the courage to challenge long-held beliefs about 
sovereignty. 
D. Restoration and Triumph of Parliament 
The instability of the Civil War and Interregnum resulted in a 
restoration of the Stuart monarchy.  The Stuart restoration, however, 
settled very little.  Claims that supreme authority resided in the king 
survived the execution of Charles I and were again trotted out during 
the reigns of Charles II and James II.  For example, John Brydall in 
1681 described the king as “the sole Legislator” who alone “gives Life, 
and Being, and Title of Laws” with or without the consent of 
Parliament.43  Parliament, in Brydall’s words, was “only Consultative 
or Preparative” in the making of law.44  An anonymous royalist 
pamphleteer writing in 1683 was more blunt: “In the presence of His 
Majesty, both, or either Houses of Parliament, have no Power to 
command . . . . So the Power of both or either Houses of Parliament, 
 
 41. AN AGREEMENT OF THE PEOPLE, reprinted in PURITANISM AND LIBERTY, supra note 39, at 
443, 444. 
 42. Id. 
 43. JOHN BRYDALL, THE ABSURDITY OF THAT NEW DEVISED STATE-PRINCIPLE, reprinted in 2 
STRUGGLE FOR SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 19, at 787. 
 44. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
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is but upon sufferance, in the presence of their Sovereign His 
Majesty.”45 
Because of fears of Catholic absolutism and James’s assertion of 
control over local government,46 James’s Protestant magnates invited 
William of Orange and Mary to save the realm.  With the nation’s 
quick embrace of William, James tossed the Great Seal into the 
Thames and fled to the court of Louis XIV.  William became the 
provisional leader of the government upon James’s “abdication.”  He 
then issued writs for a Convention Parliament to meet to decide the 
fate of the Crown.  Though there was some support for bringing 
James back under certain limitations, James ended this talk when he 
announced that he would not accept limits on his royal authority.  
Because of James’s recalcitrance, William and Mary were offered and 
accepted the throne.  They also agreed to certain limitations on royal 
power as enumerated in the English Bill of Rights.47  The key 
provisions of the Bill of Rights forbade the monarch from suspending 
laws without the consent of Parliament, from using the prerogative 
power to gain extra-parliamentary grants of revenue, and from 
creating or maintaining standing armies without the consent of 
Parliament.48  This acceptance of limited power marked the 
successful conclusion of the so-called Glorious Revolution. 
The Bill of Rights did not put forth the doctrine of parliamentary 
supremacy, nor did it disclaim the divine right of kings.  Nonetheless, 
 
 45. THE ARRAIGNMENT OF CO-ORDINATE POWER, reprinted in 2 STRUGGLE FOR 
SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 19, at 800. 
 46. See JOHN MILLER, THE GLORIOUS REVOLUTION 3 (1983) (noting that James “thought in 
terms of simple polar opposites and found in the Catholic Church an unquestionable authority, 
which (he felt) other Churches lacked”). 
 47. J.R. JONES, THE REVOLUTION OF 1688 IN ENGLAND 316 (1972). 
 48. THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1689), reprinted in FROM MAGNA CARTA TO THE CONSTITUTION 39 
(David L. Brooks ed., 1993). 
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the Glorious Revolution did mark the beginning of parliamentary 
sovereignty in the Bodin mold.  With the monarch unable to raise 
significant revenues without parliamentary consent, Parliament 
effectively assumed the helm of the ship of state.  What began as an 
advisory council of great magnates was fast becoming the ultimate 
sovereign in the English political system. 
In summary, the 1600s was a century of great change and debate.  
The century began with a monarch devoted to the divine right of 
kings and ended with the ignominious flight of his grandson.  The 
efforts of the Stuarts to rule without Parliament resulted in the 
demise of their beloved divine right theory and the weakening of the 
monarchy.  God’s supposed Lieutenant on earth had lost much of his 
luster.  Although it would be some time before Parliament reduced 
the monarch to a mere figurehead, the Stuarts’ refusal to exit a gilded 
road that no longer led into the future accelerated this process. 
The instability caused by clashes between the Crown and 
Parliament in the 1640s permitted Englishmen to debate the first 
principles of society.  And in that debate some voices argued for 
popular sovereignty to replace divine right theory.  Under the 
Leveller theory, departments of government were but the servants of 
the omnipotent people.  To put theory into practice, the Levellers 
created a written constitution called the Agreement of the People.  
The Agreement was ahead of its time and offered an alternative to 
divine right and parliamentary supremacy. Although England was 
not ready to embrace popular sovereignty, it would not be long until 
thirteen English colonies would embrace it. 
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II 
SOVEREIGNTY AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
In the decades prior to the American Revolution, the principle of 
parliamentary sovereignty was well established.  Until the American 
colonists began to rethink the concept of  sovereignty in the 1760s, 
most British subjects at home and abroad agreed on the locus of 
sovereignty.  Parliament was the bedrock of British liberty—the 
champion of the people in the battle against royal absolutism.  This 
stability of parliamentary supremacy promised that the king would 
never again challenge Parliament, and that the various concepts of 
sovereignty and society put forward in the Putney debates during the 
Civil War would not threaten the status quo.  All was good with the 
British constitution until the mother country developed a renewed 
interest in her North American colonies. 
A. Blackstone on Parliamentary Sovereignty 
During the 1760s, the place and power of Parliament was 
memorialized by the great William Blackstone in his Commentaries 
on the Laws of England.  Parliament, according to Blackstone, 
consisted of “the king’s majesty, sitting there in his royal political 
capacity, and the three estates of the realm; the lords spiritual, the 
lords temporal, (who sit, together with the king, in one house) and 
the commons, who sit by themselves in another.”49  The 
Commentaries thus recognized that the principle of king-in-
parliament was settled.  The Stuart proposition that the Lords and 
Commons were dispensable was but a part of history.  Blackstone 
 
 49. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *153. 
03__WATKINS.DOC 11/1/2007  3:37:21 PM 
 
VOL. 1 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW &   PUBLIC POLICY 2006 
 
? 175 ? 
was clear that “[t]he crown cannot begin of itself any alteration in the 
present established law. . . .”50 
Regarding the power of Parliament, Blackstone described it as 
follows: 
It hath sovereign and uncontrollable authority in the making, 
confirming, enlarging, restraining, abrogating, repealing, 
reviving, and expounding of laws, concerning matters of all 
possible denominations, ecclesiastical, or temporal, civil military, 
maritime, or criminal; this being the place where that absolute 
despotic power, which must, in all governments, reside 
somewhere, is entrusted by the constitution of these kingdoms.51 
Nor was fundamental law beyond the reach of parliament in 
Blackstone’s estimation: “It can change and create afresh even the 
constitution of the kingdom . . . .”52  Once Parliament takes an action 
regarding the constitution or a lesser matter, “no authority upon 
earth can undo” it.53 
The phrase “no authority” also included the people of Great 
Britain.  Under the accepted doctrine, if Parliament enacted 
pernicious laws that threatened the liberty of the people, “the subjects 
of this kingdom are left without all manner of remedy.”54  Parliament 
was not an agent or trustee of the people and thus subject to their 
sanction—Parliament was sovereign.55  Blackstone specifically took 
 
 50. Id. at *154; see also id. at *155 (“Like three distinct powers in mechanics, they jointly 
impel the machine of government in a direction different from what either, acting by itself, would 
have done .  .  .  .”). 
 51. Id. at *160 (emphasis added). 
 52. Id at *161. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 9 (8th 
ed., Liberty Fund 1982) (1885); see also John V. Jezierski, James Wilson and Blackstone on the 
Nature and Location of Sovereignty 32 J. HIST. IDEAS 95, 103 (1971) (“In short, Parliament was 
able to do everything that was not naturally impossible, and what it did no authority on earth was 
able to undo.”). 
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aim at John Locke’s assertion that Parliament was “only a fiduciary 
power to act for certain ends” and that the people possessed 
“supreme power to remove or alter the legislative[] when they find 
the legislative act contrary to the trust reposed in them.”56  
Blackstone derided Locke’s logic as “theory” and alien to the British 
constitution as it had actually developed.57  Without elaboration, he 
refused to adopt or argue from Locke’s reasoning and instead 
affirmed “that the power of parliament is absolute and without 
control.”58 
This absolute power followed British subjects within the empire.  
As explained during the Stamp Act crisis by Martin Howard, Jr., 
“[e]very Englishmen, therefore, is subject to [Parliament’s] 
jurisdiction, and it follows him wherever he goes.  It is of the essence 
of government, that there should be a supreme head, and it would be 
a solecism in politicks to talk of members independent of it.”59  Thus, 
the British constitution’s concept of sovereignty applied to the 
American colonists as if the colonists resided in London.  So long as 
they resided on soil controlled by Great Britain, Parliament was their 
master. 
B. De Facto Home Rule 
The decades before the American Revolution were dynamic.  
Between 1750 and 1770, Britain’s North American colonists doubled 
from 1 million to 2 million.60  With this increase in population came 
 
 56. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 77–78 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett 
Publishing Co. 1980) (1690) (emphasis omitted). 
 57. BLACKSTONE, supra note 49, at *162. 
 58. Id. 
 59. MARTIN HOWARD, JR., A LETTER FROM A GENTLEMAN AT HALIFAX (1765), reprinted in 
TRACTS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 63, 67 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1967). 
 60. GORDON S. WOOD, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 6 (2002). 
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an increase in the colonies’ value to the mother country.  Colonial 
imports from Britain rose from a little under £1 million to over £2 
million.61  Taking colonial exports into account, the mother country 
enjoyed a £500,000 trade surplus with the colonies.62 
Although profitability was the main purpose for possession of 
colonies, there was no master or centralized plan to achieve this 
result.  The colonies developed naturally on the backs of enterprising 
individuals.  Britain’s imperial structure was dilapidated and 
inefficient—certainly incapable of hindering the growing colonies.63  
This neglect of colonial matters left Americans with a strong sense of 
self-sufficiency and self-government.64  British officials were seldom 
in a position to interfere with colonists’ economic and social pursuits, 
and the colonists took advantage of their independence—often to the 
benefit of the empire.  This independence was the case not just in 
North America, but throughout the peripheries of the empire.  Local 
bodies in Wales, Scotland, and Ireland enjoyed an independence that 
would have been unthinkable under a more centralized, European 
monarchy.65  Such a localization of power was a direct result of 
Parliament’s triumph in the Glorious Revolution and the Crown’s 
inability to raise revenue without resorting to the British Parliament 
or the representative assemblies of the various colonies.66 
This hands-off approach to the colonies changed with the 
conclusion of the Seven Years’ War in 1763.  The victorious British 
 
 61. Id. at 13. 
 62. Id. at 14–15. 
 63. Id. at 5. 
 64. SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 181–82 
(1965). 
 65. JACK P. GREENE, PERIPHERIES AND CENTER: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE 
EXTENDED POLITIES OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE AND THE UNITED STATES 1607–1788, at 63 (1986). 
 66. Id. at 64. 
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forces acquired vast new territories in North America from France 
and Spain.  While the new territory promised to be a great boon for 
the empire, the cost of its acquisition was high.  The war debt rose to 
£317 million with £5 million in annual interest.67  Considering that 
the empire’s peacetime budget was about £8 million, the debt was 
staggering.68  In addition to this preexisting debt, Britain faced the 
prospect of additional expenditures in organizing the new territories 
and appointing royal officials.  Britain also faced the prospect of 
keeping the peace with hostile Indian tribes that unhappily found 
themselves under British jurisdiction.  The ever-present colonial 
hunger for land made conflict inevitable; therefore, Britain estimated 
that it would need 10,000 regular troops stationed in North America 
to handle the peacekeeping duties.69 
Raising additional revenue was not an easy task.  Britons suffered 
under a heavy tax burden and many felt that the colonists gained the 
most benefit from the victory over France.70 Taxation in Britain had 
reached upwards of thirty percent of landowners’ incomes before the 
Seven Years’ War.71  The British Treasury estimated that the average 
colonist paid one-fiftieth of the taxes paid by the average British 
subject living in the mother country.72  Hence, Britons of all classes 
and parties believed it was time for the colonists to pay something 
towards their own defense.73 
 
 67. WOOD, supra note 60, at 17. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 18. 
 70. W.E. WOODWARD, A NEW AMERICAN HISTORY 126–27 (1938). 
 71. Id. at 126. 
 72. PAUL JOHNSON, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 132 (1997). 
 73. Id. 
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C. Imperial Restructuring 
The first revenue-generating measure passed by Parliament was 
the Sugar Act of 1764.74  As stated in its preamble, the purpose of the 
Act was “defraying the expences of defending, protecting, and 
securing” the North American colonies.75  The Sugar Act lowered the 
duties on foreign molasses, but increased the duties on various 
luxury items such as linen, silk, and wine.76  The increased duties 
were ill-timed because the North American colonies were 
experiencing a post-war economic downturn.77  A flurry of protests 
followed as the colonists realized that the Sugar Act would be the first 
of many other parliamentary intrusions on their independent 
existence. 
The next intervention was the infamous Stamp Act of 1765.78  It 
was the first direct, internal tax to be levied on the North American 
colonies by Parliament.79  The Act required that almost every form of 
paper used in the colonies be affixed with an official stamp.  Hence, 
the tax increased the price of legal documents, almanacs, newspapers, 
pamphlets, calendars, and numerous other items used by all classes 
of colonial society.80  Colonists regarded it with almost universal 
odium. 
The colonists believed that the Stamp Act, if accepted, would 
create a precedent harmful to American liberties.  The importance of 
 
 74. The Sugar Act (1764), in PROLOGUE TO REVOLUTION: SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS ON 
THE STAMP ACT CRISIS, 1764–1766, at 4 (Edmund S. Morgan ed., 1959) [hereinafter PROLOGUE 
TO REVOLUTION]. 
 75. Id. at 4. 
 76. Id. at 5. 
 77. WOOD, supra note 60, at 27. 
 78. The Stamp Act (1765), in PROLOGUE TO REVOLUTION, supra note 74, at 35. 
 79. MORISON, supra note 64, at 185. 
 80. The Stamp Act, supra note 78, at 35–43. 
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precedent or custom was indispensable to the British constitution.  
Because it was unwritten, the British constitution necessarily relied 
more on custom or precedent than the current United States 
Constitution.  Precedent certainly carries much weight in the 
American system, but those unhappy with precedent may also turn 
to the Constitution’s text and history when arguing for the overturn 
of precedent.  With no text, and therefore no discussion or debate 
prior to adopting the text, British subjects necessarily were limited to 
the custom of the realm as evidenced by prior course of conduct.  
Accordingly, when subjects feared that Parliament or the king was 
inserting a dangerous innovation into the constitutional order, they 
were duty-bound to create a “record” with protests and often refusals 
to abide by the unconstitutional act.81  If they failed to do so, a 
subsequent king or Parliament could build further on the precedent. 
The Boston Tea Party—typically treated as a mere tax protest—is 
a good example of the importance of precedent.  Though the Tea Act 
of 1773 reduced the price of tea, the colonists felt compelled to take 
action to prevent Parliament from setting a revenue precedent.  
Under commercial rules, a ship entering a colonial harbor was not 
permitted to leave without offloading its cargo.  If the tea was 
offloaded, a duty would be paid; if it was not offloaded within twenty 
days, the cargo would be seized by customs officials who would 
retain a portion of the merchandise to satisfy the duty.  The Tea Party 
occurred on the nineteenth day that the ships bearing tea had been in 
the harbor.  The colonists destroyed the tea so it could not be seized 
by the customs officials and the duty technically “paid” to form the 
basis of a precedent.82  With this background, one can better 
 
 81. See generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 9–34 (2004). 
 82. Id. at 18. 
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understand why the colonists so vehemently opposed the Stamp Act 
as the first direct, internal tax levied by Parliament.  They simply 
could not afford for such a tax to become precedent. 
The resolutions and protests from the various colonial assemblies 
shared a number of characteristics.  First, they pointed to the lack of 
precedent for Parliament levying direct, internal taxes on the 
colonies.  In the words of the Maryland assembly: 
[H]is Majestys liege People of this Ancient Province have always 
enjoyed the Right of being Governed by Laws to which they 
themselves have consented in the Articles of Taxes and internal 
Polity and that the same hath never been forfeited or any other 
way Yielded up but hath been Constantly recognized by the King 
and People of Great Britain.83 
Often connected to the precedent argument was a “knowledge” 
argument based on divergent local circumstances.  The Virginia 
House of Burgesses lectured Parliament that only representatives 
chosen by the people “can . . . know what Taxes the People are able to 
bear, or the easiest Method of raising them.”84  Considering the 
challenges of travel and communications in the eighteenth century, 
this was a strong argument.  Parliament was attempting to enact a 
comprehensive, one-size-fits-all tax on colonies as different as South 
Carolina and Massachusetts.  A complex task made all the more 
difficult because no member of Parliament was from either colony 
and very few, if any, had personal knowledge of the colonial 
circumstances. 
The knowledge problem aside, the colonials also protested that 
the members of Parliament levying the tax on the colonies would not 
feel the pinch of the tax.  According to the Virginia House of 
 
 83. The Maryland Resolves (1765), in PROLOGUE TO REVOLUTION, supra note 74, at 52, 53. 
 84. The Resolutions as Printed in The Journal of the House of Burgesses (1765), in PROLOGUE 
TO REVOLUTION, supra note 74, at 47, 48. 
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Burgesses, this shared burden by elected representatives “is the only 
Security against a burthensome Taxation, and the distinguishing 
Characteristic of British Freedom, without which the ancient 
Constitution cannot exist.”85  When legislating for Britain, a member 
of Parliament would feel the bite of tax or ill-conceived law in the 
same manner as electors and those non-electors who were “virtually 
represented.”  This was not true for American colonists virtually 
represented in Parliament.  Members of Parliament could not feel the 
effects of laws on the colonials, nor were they present to witness the 
effects.  Thus, the doctrine of shared burdens proved to be a 
compelling argument against virtual representation.86 
Keying in on representation, the colonial assemblies also made 
the famous taxation-without-representation argument known by 
every schoolchild.  The phrase “no taxation without representation,” 
however, is a bit more complicated than most Americans have been 
led to believe.  Under the customs of the British constitution, 
taxation was a gift from the people to the king and was thereby 
distinguished from ordinary legislation.87  Because one cannot gift 
something if one does not have a claim to it, taxation was closely tied 
to representation.88  The Connecticut assembly expressed the ideas as 
follows: 
That in the Opinion of this House, An Act for raising Money by 
Duties or Taxes differs from other Acts of Legislation, in that it is 
 
 85. Id. 
 86. JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE 
AUTHORITY TO TAX 239–41 (1987). 
 87. DANIEL DULANY, CONSIDERATIONS ON THE PROPRIETY OF IMPOSING TAXES IN THE 
BRITISH COLONIES FOR THE PURPOSE OF RAISING A REVENUE BY ACT OF PARLIAMENT (1765), 
reprinted in TRACTS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, supra note 59, at 94, 95–96; EDMUND S. 
MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE 239–40 (1988). 
 88. DULANY, supra note 87, at 95–96; MORGAN, supra note 87, at 239–40; REID, supra note 
86, at 87. 
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always considered as a free Gift of the People made by their legal, 
and elected Representatives, And that we cannot conceive, that 
the People of great Britain, or their Representatives, have Right, 
to dispose of our Property.89 
Because the colonists, via the franchise, had not authorized any 
member of Parliament to consent to taxation, the Stamp Act was 
void.  It followed that colonial “gifts” to the king could only come 
from the colonial assemblies.  In fact, the colonists through Benjamin 
Franklin suggested that the king should approach them directly if he 
desired revenue: “when aids to the Crown are wanted, they are to be 
asked of the several assemblies, according to the old established 
usage, who will, as they have always done, grant them freely.”90  The 
colonists’ reasoning on this point was sound, and many Britons, 
including William Pitt, agreed that Parliament could not tax the 
colonies.91 
Of course, the colonists’ protests went far beyond respectful 
resolves and petitions.  Rioters took to the streets and burned sheets 
of stamps.92  Tax collectors became pariahs and some were forced to 
take refuge with British troops.93  Fearing for their lives and lacking 
faith in British protection, many of the stamp agents simply 
resigned.94  Organized extra-legal groups known as “Sons of Liberty” 
 
 89. The Connecticut Resolves (1765), in PROLOGUE TO REVOLUTION, supra note 74, at 54, 
55. 
 90. The Examination of Dr. Benjamin Franklin (1766), in PROLOGUE TO REVOLUTION, supra 
note 74, at 143, 144. 
 91. The Role of William Pitt, in PROLOGUE TO REVOLUTION, supra note 74, at 134, 136 (“It is 
my opinion, that this kingdom has no right to lay taxes upon the colonies. . . . Taxation is no part 
of the governing or legislative power.  The taxes are a voluntary gift and grant of the Commons 
alone. . . . When, therefore, in this House we give and grant, we give and grant what is our own.  
But in an American tax, what would we do?”); JOHNSON, supra note 72, at 133–34. 
 92. JOHNSON, supra note 72, at 133. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Gordon Wood, A Note on Mobs in the American Revolution, 23 WM. & MARY Q. 635, 
635 (1966). 
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sprang up across the colonies.95  These organizations persuaded 
lawyers, judges, and merchants to carry on their business without 
using the detested stamps.96  They also carried out a successful 
campaign to boycott certain British goods.97 
The boycott proved so effective that by 1766 London merchants 
petitioned Parliament for the repeal of the Stamp Act.98  As discussed 
earlier, the distinguished William Pitt and his followers agreed with 
the Americans’ constitutional complaints regarding taxation and 
representation.  These factors, along with Parliament’s desire to end 
the violence against stamp agents, led to the repeal of the Stamp Act.  
However, even those members of Parliament who joined with the 
Americans in seeking a repeal of the Act desired to reaffirm the 
power and ultimate sovereignty of Parliament.  Pitt, in his speech 
urging repeal, counseled as follows: 
At the same time, let the sovereign authority of this country over 
the colonies, be asserted in as strong terms as can be devised, and 
be made to extend to every point of legislation whatsoever.  That 
we may bind their trade, confine their manufactures, and exercise 
every power whatsoever, except that of taking their money out of 
their pockets without their consent.99 
This sentiment would give rise to the Declaratory Act of 1766 in 
which Parliament claimed the power “to make all laws and statutes of 
sufficient force to bind the colonies and people of America, subjects 
 
 95. WOOD, supra note 60, at 29–30.  For a general discussion of mob activity in colonial 
America, see EDWARD COUNTRYMAN, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 74–104 (1985). 
 96. WOOD, supra note 60, at 30. 
 97. Id. 
 98. The Petition of the London Merchants to the House of Commons (1766), in PROLOGUE 
TO REVOLUTION, supra note 74, at 130, 130. 
 99. The Role of William Pitt, supra note 91, at 141. 
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of the crown of Great Britain, in all cases whatsoever.”100  This 
assertion of authority was not radical.  With the Declaratory Act, 
Parliament was simply acknowledging its place in the constitutional 
order as established in the Glorious Revolution.  The Declaratory 
Act, however, caused the colonists to accelerate their examination of 
the doctrine of sovereignty. 
D. Rethinking Sovereignty 
The American thinkers sought to limit the despotic and absolute 
power of Parliament.  This was an effort to enshrine principles of 
home rule in the British constitution.101 Early efforts to limit 
parliamentary power proved clumsy and problematic.  For example, 
in 1764, James Otis published his Rights of the British Colonies in 
which he argued for continued home rule and some form of colonial 
representation in the British Parliament.102  But for home rule to 
mean anything, the power of Parliament had to be limited.  In his 
tract, Otis accepted that Parliament had “an undoubted power and 
lawful authority to make acts for the general good”103 and that 
Parliament’s power was “uncontroulable, but by themselves, and we 
must obey.”104  At the same time, Otis argued the power of 
Parliament was limited by “truth, equity, and justice” under a natural 
law formulation that prohibited Parliament from being “absolute and 
arbitrary.”105 Aside from being contradictory, Otis’s proposed 
 
 100. The Declaratory Act (1766), in 27 THE STATUTES AT LARGE 1920 (Danby Pickering ed., 
1767). 
 101. BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 204 
(1967). 
 102. JAMES OTIS, THE RIGHTS OF THE BRITISH COLONIES ASSERTED AND PROVED (1764), 
reprinted in TRACTS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, supra note 59, at 19. 
 103. Id. at 22. 
 104. Id. at 29. 
 105. Id. at 32–33. 
03__WATKINS.DOC 11/1/2007  3:37:21 PM 
 
VOL. 1 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW &   PUBLIC POLICY 2006 
 
? 186 ? 
limitation on Parliament was tantamount to a repeal of the Glorious 
Revolution.  Britons associated parliamentary sovereignty with 
British liberty; parliamentary sovereignty was English and later 
British liberty.  Otis’s unworkable and contradictory theory thus met 
with few accolades. 
Learning from Otis’s mistakes, other thinkers chose to distinguish 
between the power of Parliament and the power of colonial 
assemblies.106  They divided the powers of the colonial assemblies and 
that of Parliament into two distinct spheres.  The powers of 
Parliament were described as external, general, or imperial, while the 
powers of the assemblies were described as internal or local.  For 
example, John Dickinson writing in 1768 observed that in an empire 
composed of distinct provinces “there must exist a power somewhere 
to preside, and preserve the connection in due order.”107  If the issue 
concerned the empire as a whole, such as the regulation of trade 
among the members, Dickinson opined that the power must rest 
with Parliament.108  Direct taxation, however, was an internal matter 
and therefore outside of Parliament’s power.109  Stephen Hopkins of 
Rhode Island agreed with Dickinson on this point and urged his 
fellow colonists to “patiently submit” to all laws passed by Parliament 
“for directing and governing all these general matters.”110  But for 
matters affecting only one part of the empire, Hopkins pointed to the 
 
 106. BAILYN, supra note 101, at 209. 
 107. JOHN DICKINSON, LETTERS FROM A FARMER IN PENNSYLVANIA TO THE INHABITANTS OF 
THESE BRITISH COLONIES (1768), reprinted in TRACTS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, supra 
note 59, at 127, 133. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. STEPHEN HOPKINS, THE RIGHTS OF THE COLONIES EXAMINED (1764), reprinted in 
TRACTS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, supra note 59, at 41, 49. 
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“peculiar privileges” of the different provinces as the ultimate 
authority.111 
The mother country understood that it was but a small step from 
the concept of divided sovereignty to an argument that Parliament 
had no sovereign power over the colonies.  During questioning of 
Benjamin Franklin by Parliament, he was specifically asked whether 
the colonies might not soon voice objections to Parliament’s 
regulation of external matters.  Choosing his words carefully, 
Franklin responded that while some men had presented that 
position, the colonists had yet to be persuaded.  However, he 
ominously warned that “in time they may possibly be convinced by 
these arguments.”112 
As Franklin predicted, it was not long until the colonists rejected 
the supremacy of Parliament.  By the late 1760s, the colonists had 
already become suspicious of parliamentary sovereignty.  In 1768, 
pamphleteer William Hicks observed that “while the power of the 
British parliament is acknowledged sovereign and supreme in every 
respect whatsoever, the liberty of America is no more than a 
flattering dream, and her privileges delusive shadows.”113 
Perhaps the best statement of the colonists’ rejection of 
parliamentary supremacy is Thomas Jefferson’s A Summary View of 
the Rights of British America.114 According to Jefferson’s version of 
history, the colonists left the mother country and only continued the 
 
 111. Id. at 57. 
 112. The Examination of Dr. Benjamin Franklin, supra note 90, at 146. 
 113. WILLIAM HICKS, THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF PARLIAMENTARY POWER CONSIDERED 
(1768), reprinted in TRACTS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, supra note 59, at 164, 183–84. 
 114. THOMAS JEFFERSON, A SUMMARY VIEW OF THE RIGHTS OF BRITISH AMERICA (1774), 
reprinted in TRACTS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, supra note 59, at 256.  For an excellent 
discussion of the Summary View, see DAVID N. MAYER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 28–37 (1994). 
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union with Great Britain “by submitting themselves to the same 
common sovereign, who was thereby made the central link 
connecting the several parts of the empire thus newly multiplied.”115  
Hence, the sole connection between the people of Britain and the 
colonists was George III.  To Jefferson, Parliament was a foreign 
jurisdiction having no say in the affairs of the colonies.  Jefferson 
declared a number of parliamentary enactments “void” on the “true 
ground . . . that the British parliament has no right to exercise 
authority over us.”116 
Jefferson also offered George III a road map on how to preserve 
the union between the people of Britain and the North American 
colonists.  Describing the king as “the only mediatory power between 
the several states of the British Empire,” Jefferson asked George III to 
approach Parliament to recommend the repeal of unconstitutional 
acts that were the cause of “discontents and jealousies among us.”117  
Without intercession of the king, “fraternal love and harmony 
through the whole empire” would be impossible.118 
In reality, Jefferson’s solution to the dispute between the colonies 
and mother country was impossible for the British to accept.  At the 
time Jefferson penned his Summary View, the balance created by the 
Glorious Revolution was less than 100 years old.  Although in 1774 
the balance of power tilted decidedly toward Parliament, the royal 
prerogative was not yet dead and the king still exercised substantial 
power under the British constitution.  Were the king to accept 
Jefferson’s view of royal power, the constitutional balance would shift 
away from Parliament and back toward the king.  To a nation 
 
 115. JEFFERSON, supra note 114, at 260. 
 116. Id. at 263. 
 117. Id. at 268. 
 118. Id. at 276. 
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wedded to the principles of parliamentary sovereignty and suspicious 
of attempts to augment royal power, Jefferson’s proposal was a 
constitutional heresy. 
During this time, there were formal plans of union drafted in an 
effort to avoid independence.  For example, the loyalist Joseph 
Galloway proposed a plan that would have united the thirteen 
colonies within the British Empire.  Galloway called for the creation 
of a continental assembly that he described as “a British and 
American legislature” that would “regulat[e] the administration of 
the general affairs of America.”119  In theory, this legislature would be 
“an inferior and distinct branch of the British legislature” although it 
would handle all continental matters.120  Each colony would “retain 
its present constitution, and powers of regulating and governing its 
own internal police, in all cases what[so]ever.”121 In recognition of 
the king’s authority, he was to appoint a president general to execute 
the laws passed by the new legislature.122 
With George III unwilling to intercede on behalf of the colonies 
or to accept proposals for union, the colonies declared independence.  
Consistent with the colonists’ evolving theory of sovereignty, the 
Declaration of Independence primarily addressed the “history of the 
present King of Great Britain.”123  The Declaration only indirectly 
addressed Parliament by accusing the king of “combin[ing] with 
others to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to our constitution.”124  
 
 119. Joseph Galloway, A Plan of a Proposed Union between Great Britain and the Colonies 
(1774), in  COLONIAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 391, 392 (Donald S. Lutz ed., 
1998). 
 120. Id. at 393. 
 121. Id. at 392. 
 122. Id. 
 123. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 3 (U.S. 1776). 
 124. Id. para. 16. 
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By 1776, the colonists had jettisoned Parliament from the 
constitutional scheme.  With the king serving as the only link 
between the colonists and the British Empire, there was no need to 
formally address Parliament or declare independence from 
parliamentary rule.  Because of the king’s multiple abuses, the 
colonies were “absolved from all allegiance to the British crown.”125 
The rejection of parliamentary sovereignty and connection with 
the king left ultimate sovereignty in each state legislature.  Years later 
James Madison would observe that at the time of the Revolution, 
“[t]he legislative power was maintained to be as complete in each 
American Parliament, as in the British Parliament.”126  Of course, 
some Americans were questioning whether an artificial body such as 
legislature could possess ultimate sovereignty.  According to the 
General Court of Massachusetts: 
It is a maxim, that, in every government, there must exist, 
somewhere, a supreme, sovereign, absolute, and uncontroulable 
power; But this power resides, always in the body of the people, 
and it never was, or can be delegated, to one man, or a few; the 
great Creator, having never given to men a right to vest others 
with authority over them, unlimited, either in duration or 
degree.127 
 
 125. Id. para. 33.  In his original draft, Jefferson made reference to breaking political 
connections with parliament in an effort to accommodate those who thought that parliament still 
had some power over the colonies.  MAYER, supra note 114, at 45. The final version simply stated 
that “all political connection between [the colonists] and the state of Great Britain is, and ought to 
be, totally dissolved.”  THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 123, at para. 33. 
 126. James Madison, “Mr. Madison’s Report” to the Virginia Assembly, in 4 THE DEBATES IN 
THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 562 
(Jonathan Elliot ed., 1885); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Anti-Federalists, The Federalist Papers, and 
the Big Argument for Union, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 111, 111 (1993) (“The American 
Revolution, of course, was a revolution that had been fought not simply for freedom, but for 
localism.”). 
 127. Proclamation of the General Court (1776), in THE POPULAR SOURCES OF POLITICAL 
AUTHORITY 65 (Oscar Handlin & Mary Handlin eds., 1966). 
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In other words, the people possess what Bodin or Blackstone would 
recognize as ultimate sovereignty, while the people’s agents (e.g., 
representatives, governors, and judges) possess what we today call 
governmental or legislative sovereignty, which is derived from the 
people and is inferior to the people’s ultimate sovereignty.128 
On the state level, these principles of sovereignty were enshrined 
in state constitutions and bills of rights.  For example, the Virginia 
Declaration of Rights declared that “all power is vested in, and 
consequently derived from, the People; that magistrates are their 
trustees and servants, and at all times amenable to them.”129  On the 
continental level, the issue of sovereignty did not pose a problem 
under the Articles of Confederation because Congress’s power did 
not extend to individuals. For example, Congress could not tax 
citizens; it could only make requisitions of the state governments. 
Issues of sovereignty, however, arose again with the Constitution 
of 1787.  After compromise, study, and debate, the Framers created a 
 
 128. LANCE BANNING, THE SACRED FIRE OF LIBERTY 443 n.30 (1995).  This difference between 
ultimate sovereignty and legislative sovereignty is clearly expressed in the instruction given by the 
people of Mecklenburg, North Carolina to their delegates to the provincial Congress: 
1st. Political power is of two kinds, one principal and superior, and the other derived 
and inferior. 
2nd. The principal supreme power is possessed by the people at large, the derived and 
inferior power by the servants which they employ. 
3rd. Whatever persons are delegated, chosen, employed and intrusted by the people are 
their servants and can posses only derived inferior power. 
4th. Whatever is constituted and ordained by the principal supreme power can not be 
altered, suspended or abrogated by any other power, but the same power that ordained 
may alter, suspend and abrogate its own ordinances. 
5th. The rules whereby the inferior power is to be exercised are to be constituted by the 
principal supreme power, and can be altered, suspended and abrogated by the same and 
no other. 
Instructions to the Delegates From Mecklenburg, North Carolina, to the Provincial Congress at 
Halifax (1776), in 1 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 56 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 
1987) [hereinafter Instructions]. 
 129. Instructions, supra note 128, at 6. 
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system in which the people of each state delegated power to two 
governmental sovereigns: the state and national governments.  
Madison wrote that “[t]he federal and state governments are in fact 
but different agents and trustees of the people, instituted with 
different powers, and designated for different purposes.”130  By 
ratifying the Constitution in separate state conventions, the people of 
each state took a portion of the powers originally delegated to their 
state governments and transferred this power to the national 
government.  The powers possessed by the state governments, and 
not affected by the grant to the national government, remained with 
the state governments. 
Using terms familiar to the revolutionary generation, Madison 
differentiated between the powers of the national and state 
governments.  “The former will be exercised principally on external 
objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce . . .” while 
those of the latter “will extend to all the objects, which, in the 
ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties 
of the people; and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of 
the state.”131 
Americans established a de jure federal union.  Such a union had 
existed de facto in the British Empire until the imperial 
reorganization of the 1760s when Britain attempted to curtail some 
of the privileges of home rule enjoyed by the colonists.  The argued-
for distinction between external matters controlled by the empire 
and internal matters controlled by colonial—now state—assemblies 
was enshrined into America’s fundamental law.  In this sense, the 
American Revolution was a true revolution.  The wheel began in a 
 
 130. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 239 (James Madison) (Max Beloff ed., 1987). 
 131. THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (James Madison), supra note 130, at 238. 
03__WATKINS.DOC 11/1/2007  3:37:21 PM 
 
VOL. 1 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW &   PUBLIC POLICY 2006 
 
? 193 ? 
position recognizing the federal nature of the British Empire, was 
rotated forward by British agents of imperial reorganization, and was 
eventually returned to its initial federal position by the American 
colonists via insurrection, thus completing its revolution. 
Interestingly, the American understanding of popular sovereignty 
was eventually enshrined in Blackstone’s Commentaries—albeit in St. 
George Tucker’s 1803 annotated version of the Commentaries. 
Tucker was the preeminent legal theorist of the early 1800s.  His 
annotated edition of the Commentaries was the definitive American 
legal text used in the first half of the nineteenth century.  In 
Appendix A of the first volume of the Commentaries, Tucker made 
clear that the British concept of sovereignty did not survive the 
American Revolution.  Tucker described the people as possessing 
“indefinite and unlimited power.”132  If a mere legislature exceeded a 
grant of power found in a constitution, Tucker stated that the 
resulting statute offended “against that greater power from whom all 
authority, among us, is derived” and that the offending act should be 
opposed.133  With such annotations, Tucker attempted to render 
Blackstone useable for American lawyers brought up in the 
republican tradition. 
III 
ROYAL COURTS AND SOVEREIGNTY 
Thus far, the development of the theory of sovereignty is 
primarily characterized as a struggle between the king and 
Parliament in England, and between king-in-parliament and the 
colonial assemblies in America (with the “sovereign” people of each 
 
 132. ST. GEORGE TUCKER, ON SOVEREIGNTY AND LEGISLATURE, reprinted in VIEW OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 18, 20 (Clyde N. Wilson ed., 1999). 
 133. Id. at 19. 
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state/colony brought into the fray early on in the American 
Revolution).  Noticeably absent from the front lines are courts of law, 
those institutions that today in America have the final say on the 
meaning of fundamental law. 
In understanding the absence of court power, we must remember 
that English judges were appointed by the king and served at his 
pleasure.134  If the king disagreed with a decision of a judge, the judge 
could be dismissed immediately.  The king was the font of all justice 
and the judges were his agents.  In the words of James I, “[a]s kings 
borrow their power from God, so judges from kings; and as kings are 
to account to God, so judges unto God and kings.”135  If the judges 
were presented with a question concerning the king’s prerogative, 
James instructed them to “deal not with it till you consult with the 
king or his Council.”136  Lacking independence, the judges were not 
in a position to interject themselves into disputes between the king 
and Parliament concerning the locus of ultimate sovereignty. 
Of course, some intrepid judges who were sympathetic to 
parliamentary power did challenge the king on occasion.  For 
example, Sir Edward Coke had several confrontations with James I.  
Coke was a giant of the common law, with a legal career that spanned 
three reigns.  He served as attorney general for Queen Elizabeth, 
chief justice of the Court of Common Pleas and later the Court of 
King’s Bench during the reign of James I, and a leader in Parliament 
during the reign of Charles I.137  A brilliant thinker, Coke is credited 
 
 134. J.P. Kenyon, THE STUART CONSTITUTION, supra note 24, at 75; Berman, supra note 15, at 
1674. 
 135. James I: Speech to the Judges in Star Chamber (1616), in THE STUART CONSTITUTION, 
supra note 24, at 84, 84. 
 136. Id. at 85. 
 137. Berman, supra note 15, at 1674. 
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with outlining the principles that have become modern law.138  
Although ahead of his time, it is a mistake to view Coke’s efforts out 
of context and thus erroneously credit him with establishing an early 
form of judicial review. 
A. Prohibitions del Roy 
Perhaps Coke’s most celebrated clash with James I occurred 
during the case entitled Prohibitions del Roy, which dealt with use of 
a writ of prohibition.139  A writ of prohibition was a process whereby 
high court judges could stay the proceedings of inferior courts.140  
The writ was more than an affront to an inferior court’s jurisdiction; 
it also had monetary implications for the judges.  Judges depended 
on fees generated by litigation for their incomes.141  Thus, judges 
were eager to hear numerous cases and especially those involving real 
property, which promised the most lucrative fees.142 
The case of Prohibitions del Roy concerned the issue of payment 
of tithes over which the Ecclesiastical courts claimed jurisdiction.143  
The Archbishop of Canterbury complained to James about Coke’s 
use of the writ of prohibition in tithe cases, and the king took up the 
matter with his chief justice.  The king averred that he “himself may 
decide [cases] in his royal person, and that the judges are but the 
delegates of the king, and that the king may take what causes he shall 
please to determine from the determination of the judges, and may 
 
 138. See generally John Underwood Lewis, Sir Edward Coke (1552-1634): His Theory of 
“Artificial Reason” as a Context for Modern Basic Legal Theory, in LAW, LIBERTY, AND 
PARLIAMENT 107 (Allen D. Boyer ed., 2004). 
 139. Prohibitions del Roy (1607), in THE STUART CONSTITUTION, supra note 24, at 80, 80. 
 140. W.J. Jones, The Crown and the Courts in England, 1603-1625, in LAW, LIBERTY, AND 
PARLIAMENT, supra note 138, at 282, 290. 
 141. J.P. Kenyon, THE STUART CONSTITUTION, supra note 24, at 74. 
 142. Id. at 75. 
 143. Prohibitions del Roy (1607), in THE STUART CONSTITUTION, supra note 24, at 80, 80. 
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determine them himself.”144  While Coke agreed that the king is 
always present in court, he denied that a king could actually sit in 
judgment outside the king’s position as chief justice of the House of 
Lords.145  Coke further observed that the king lacked the requisite 
learning in the law to serve as a judge outside the House of Lords.146 
When the king became angry and asked if Coke meant to put him 
under law, Coke responded by quoting Bracton “quod rex non debet 
esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et lege” (that the king was under no 
man, but under God and the law).147  James took umbrage at the 
remark, reportedly flying into a rage and threatening to strike 
Coke.148  Fearing the king’s wrath, Coke fell to his knees and begged 
James for forgiveness.149 
Dissatisfied with Coke’s independent streak, James transferred 
Coke from the office of chief justice of Common Pleas to chief justice 
of King’s Bench.150  This was a “promotion” in status but adversely 
affected Coke’s financial position because the litigation in King’s 
Bench brought in lesser fees.151  At King’s Bench, Coke continued to 
anger James by refusing to postpone certain hearings so the king 
could “consult” with his judges.152  Eventually, the king ended Coke’s 
judicial career by dismissing him from King’s Bench.153  Coke was 
 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 81. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Allen D. Boyer, Introduction to LAW, LIBERTY, AND PARLIAMENT, supra note 138, at vii, 
ix. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Thomas G. Barnes, Introduction to Coke’s “Commentary on Littleton,” in LAW, LIBERTY, 
AND PARLIAMENT, supra note 138, at 1, 15. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
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then elected to Parliament where he continued to oppose the king.  
In 1621, Coke was imprisoned in the Tower of London for his zeal in 
impeaching state officers. 
While there was a boldness to Coke’s actions as a judge, this 
boldness should not be overstated.  The courts were hardly a check 
on the king’s power, as evidenced by Coke’s prostration before the 
king and his demotion to, and subsequent dismissal from, King’s 
Bench.  Judges were agents of the Crown; they were not an 
independent branch of government meant to limit royal authority.154  
A system with despotic power residing in a king—by its very 
nature—must reject the power of courts to review or overturn 
pronouncements of law. 
B. Dr. Bonham’s Case 
Much has also been made of Coke’s supposed judicial limitations 
on Parliament’s power.  In support of this, scholars cite155 to Coke’s 
opinion in Dr. Bonham’s Case156 in which Coke stated that “when an 
act of parliament is against common right and reason, or repugnant, 
or impossible to be performed, the common law will controul it, and 
adjudge such act to be void.”157  Taken out of context, this statement 
sounds much akin to the modern concept of judicial review, with 
which American lawyers are familiar. 
Dr. Bonham’s Case arose out of a dispute between Dr. Thomas 
Bonham and the Royal College of Physicians.  Pursuant to a charter 
granted by Henry VII that was later confirmed by an act of 
 
 154. Jones, supra note 140, at 282 (“Notions that the king was ‘opposed’ by judges or common 
lawyers lack credibility.”). 
 155. See, e.g., John V. Orth, Did Sir Edward Coke Mean What He Said?, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 
33 (1999). 
 156. Dr. Bonham’s Case, (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (K.B.), 8 Co. Rep.107a. 
 157. 77 Eng. Rep. at 652, 8 Co. Rep. at 118a. 
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Parliament,158 the college was authorized to (1) fine persons 
practicing medicine in London without a license from the college, (2) 
govern London’s medical community, and (3) fine and imprison 
those guilty of malpractice.159  The president and censors of the 
college were permitted to retain half of the money they received for 
fines imposed.160  As a royal creation, the college was closely tied to 
the monarchy and its power often increased and diminished along 
with the monarch’s.161  After a period of dormancy, the college began 
to exercise its prosecutorial and judicial powers in the late 1500s and 
early 1600s.162 
In 1605, Dr. Bonham attempted to join the college, but the 
membership rejected him.163  Despite a warning from the college, 
Bonham continued to practice medicine in London.164  For his 
intransigence, Bonham was fined and imprisoned.  The Court of 
Common Pleas, over which Coke presided, released him within a 
week on a writ of habeas corpus.165  Annoyed at Coke’s actions, royal 
officials and several judges met at Lord Chancellor Ellesmere’s home 
and encouraged the college to sue Bonham in the Court of King’s 
Bench.166  Following this advice, the college sued Dr. Bonham in 
 
 158. Harold J. Cook, Against Common Right and Reason: The College of Physicians v. Dr. 
Thomas Bonham, in LAW, LIBERTY, AND PARLIAMENT, supra note 138, at 127, 130. 
 159. Allen Dillard Boyer, “Understanding, Authority, and Will”: Sir Edward Coke and the 
Elizabethan Origins of Judicial Review, 39 B.C. L. Rev. 43, 82 (1997). 
 160. J.W. GOUGH, FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 33 (Oxford 
Univ. Press, 1955). 
 161. Cook, supra note 158, at 131. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 134–35. 
 164. Id. at 135. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 136. 
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King’s Bench seeking ₤60 in fines for illicit practice.167 Tellingly, the 
attorney general, rather than the college’s attorney, handled the 
case.168 Bonham filed his own suit in Common Pleas seeking £100 for 
false imprisonment.169 
While the case in Common Pleas was pending, King’s Bench 
ruled in favor of the college and imprisoned Dr. Bonham for his 
inability to pay the fine.170  One year later, Coke ruled in favor of Dr. 
Bonham and ordered him released.  Coke detested anti-competitive 
monopolies such as that possessed by the college.171  Construing the 
college’s royal charter narrowly, Coke ruled that the college could 
fine a person for illicit practice, but it could only imprison for 
malpractice.172 Further, to the extent that the college could be a judge 
and party to a case via its judicial powers, Coke construed the clause 
as an absurdity.  Right before his famous statement about common 
right and reason, Coke noted that “censors cannot be judges, 
ministers, and parties; judges to give sentence or judgment; ministers 
to make summons; and parties to have the moiety of the 
forfeiture.”173  In other words, he was merely exercising a cannon of 
statutory interpretation whereby a statute contradicting established 
legal principles is narrowly construed so the result is not absurd 
(because Parliament, in its wisdom, could not have intended an 
 
 167. Id. at 137. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 139. 
 171. Elizabeth Read Foster, The Procedure of the House of Commons Against Patents and 
Monopolies, 1621–1624, in LAW, LIBERTY, AND PARLIAMENT, supra note 138, at 302, 302–27. 
 172. Cook, supra note 158, at 142. 
 173. Dr. Bonham’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 652, 8 Co. Rep. at 118a. 
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absurd result).174 This is exactly how Blackstone read the holding in 
Dr. Bonham’s Case: 
[A]cts of parliament that are impossible to be performed are of 
no validity; and if there arise out of them collaterally any absurd 
consequences, manifestly contradictory to common reason, they 
are, with regard to those collateral consequences, void. . . . But 
where some collateral matter arises out of the general words, and 
happens to be unreasonable, there the judges are in decency to 
conclude that this consequence was not foreseen by the 
parliament, and therefore they are at liberty to expound the 
statute by equity, and only quoad hoc disregard it.  Thus, if an act 
of parliament gives a man power to try all causes, that arise 
within his manor of Dale; yet, if a cause should arise in which he 
himself is a party, the act is construed not to extend to that, 
because it is unreasonable that any man should determine his 
own quarrel.  But, if we could conceive it possible for the 
parliament to enact, that he should try as well his own causes as 
those of other persons, there is no court that has power to defeat 
the intent of the legislature, when couched in such evident and 
express words, as leave no doubt whether it was the intent of the 
legislature or no.175 
Such an interpretation of Dr. Bonham’s Case also makes sense in 
light of Coke’s championing of the power of Parliament.  For 
example, Coke was a driving force behind the Petition of Right in 
1628, which served as an indictment of the Stuart monarchy and its 
efforts to rule by royal prerogative.  The Petition obligated the king 
not to tax without the consent of Parliament, not to arbitrarily 
imprison subjects without a showing of just cause, not to billet 
soldiers on civilians without their consent, and not to use martial law 
against civilians.176  In the 1620s, Coke also angered the king when he 
chaired Parliament’s Committee of Grievances that investigated 
 
 174. GOUGH, supra note 160, at 40. 
 175. BLACKSTONE, supra note 49, at *91. 
 176. The Petition of Right (1628), in THE STUART CONSTITUTION, supra note 24, at 68, 68. 
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grants of monopoly and patents such as that possessed by the Royal 
College in Dr. Bonham’s Case.177  Moreover, in his Institutes, which 
was a comprehensive study of English law, Coke described the power 
of Parliament to pass statutes as “so transcendent and absolute” that 
“it cannot be confined either for causes or persons within any 
bounds.”178 
Considering Coke’s efforts to limit the monarch’s power and to 
enhance Parliament’s power, it is unlikely he sought to give judges 
the power to strike Parliament’s statutes via judicial review in Dr. 
Bonham’s Case.  Because the judges served at the pleasure of the king 
and were part of the executive branch, judicial review would have 
weakened Parliament while augmenting the power of the king.  This 
certainly was not Coke’s intention.  As Harold Cook has observed, 
with Dr. Bonham’s Case, Coke “meant to overturn a royal patent 
when it seemed unjust rather than to argue for common law 
jurisdiction over Acts of Parliament.”179 
IV 
AMERICAN COURTS AND SOVEREIGNTY 
The power of colonial and early American courts followed the 
pattern set in Britain.  Theories of parliamentary/legislative 
sovereignty ensured that courts remained incapable of limiting the 
power of the sovereign.  The rise of popular sovereignty, however, 
brought a new function for the courts: the power of judicial review.  
Over time, judicial review metamorphosed into the judicial 
supremacy enjoyed by the United States Supreme Court and its state 
 
 177. Foster, supra note 171, at 312. 
 178. EDWARD COKE, Of the High and Most Honourable Court of Parliament, in 2 THE 
SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD COKE 1133 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003). 
 179. Cook, supra note 158, at 146. 
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court counterparts.  The question remains whether judicial 
supremacy was a natural development stemming from judicial review 
or whether it represents a much older view of sovereignty. 
A. The Judiciary in Early America 
Americans recognized the danger presented by a judiciary 
dependent upon the monarch.  In England, the 1701 Act of 
Settlement had granted English judges tenure during “good 
behavior”—judges were no longer removable at the whim of the king.  
The Act of Settlement, however, did not extend to the colonies.  
Thus, the colonists complained in the Declaration of Independence 
that the king “has made judges dependent on his will alone, for the 
tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their 
salaries.”180 
Of course, complaints about abuses from the executive branch 
extended much further than the judiciary.  For example, colonial 
governors attempted to influence the colonial assemblies by 
appointing legislators to judicial and other offices and by offering 
legislators government contracts and other opportunities for 
personal profit.181  If the legislators were not compliant with the 
governor’s wishes, the governor could always remove the benefit 
bestowed.  For example, during the Stamp Act crisis, the governor of 
Massachusetts took away commissions from officers in the state 
militia who also served in the legislature as punishment for their 
opposition to British policy.182 
To remedy these abuses, early American constitutions reduced 
the power of the executive branch and increased that of the 
 
 180. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 123, at para. 12. 
 181. GORDON S. WOOD, CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787, at 157 (1969). 
 182. Id. 
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legislature—the one branch of government most closely connected 
with the people.183  The governors’ terms were limited, and many 
state legislatures began to exercise what had been, and are recognized 
today, as executive functions (e.g., declaring war or pardoning 
persons convicted of crimes).184  In ten of the newly independent 
states, the executive was appointed by the legislature, and in only two 
states could the executive serve more than one year.185  In only four 
states did the executive enjoy the power of appointment—the 
remaining nine lodged the power in the legislature.186  Although 
today we associate some sort of veto power with the executive 
branch, in the early constitutions only three states granted the 
executive this power.187  Hence, via term limits, legislative control, 
and reduction in executive functions, the people sought to prevent 
the abuse they had suffered under royal governors. 
The grievances against the king and royal governors did not 
translate immediately into establishment of the state judiciaries as 
independent, co-equal branches of government.  For example, in 
South Carolina and New Jersey, the judiciary was not considered as a 
separate and autonomous branch of government.188  At first blush, 
such arrangements seem to violate basic separation-of-powers 
principles. Today, we recognize three general governmental 
functions: the making of laws, the execution of laws, and the 
application/interpretation of the laws as they relate to cases and 
 
 183. Id. at 155. 
 184. Id. 
 185. JACKSON TURNER MAIN, THE SOVEREIGN STATES, 1775–1783, at 188–89 (1973). 
 186. Id. at 192. 
 187. Id. at 193. 
 188. WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 267 (Rita & Robert Kimber 
trans., Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2001) (1973). 
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controversies.189  As stated above, for many years in England the 
judicial power was considered a branch of the executive department, 
and this view was accepted by some American thinkers.190 However, 
the trend was to view government power as divided into three 
separate branches so that, in Jefferson’s words, “no person should 
exercise the powers of more than one of them at the same time.”191  
The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 stated the predominant view 
as follows: 
In the government of this Commonwealth, the legislative 
department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, 
or either of them: The executive shall never exercise the legislative 
and judicial powers, or either of them: The judicial shall never 
exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them: to 
the end it may be a government of laws and not of men.192 
While to modern Americans such sentiments seem to compel the 
creation of a separate and distinct judicial branch with the power of 
judicial review, this was not the understanding at the time of 
independence.  In the rush to weaken the executive branch (which to 
some colonists would include the judicial),193 the Americans realized 
that the legislature could violate its delegated powers.  But to protect 
themselves from unconstitutional enactments, the people did not 
look to the courts.  Instead, the people believed that the best security 
would be internal safeguards such as bicameralism, delaying veto, 
 
 189. M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 23 (Liberty Fund 
1998) (1967). 
 190. Id. at 151. 
 191. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 120 (William Peden ed., 1982). 
Even Blackstone in the 1760s recognized the three branches as distinct and counseled for a 
general separation. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 49, at *269. 
 192. Massachusetts Constitution (1780), in 1 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 56, supra note 
128, at 11, 13–14. 
 193. As late as the 1780s, courts “were generally considered an undifferentiated segment of 
the executive branch.”  WILLIAM E. NELSON, MARBURY V. MADISON: THE ORIGINS AND LEGACY 
OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 34 (2000). 
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term limits, frequent elections, and juries.194  And while not all of 
these safeguards appeared in each state constitution, some 
combination of them did. 
Moreover, as pointed out by historian Gordon Wood, “the early 
constitution-makers had little sense that judicial independence 
meant independence from the people.”195 Juries were especially 
sacrosanct bodies and could not be overridden by a judge, even if the 
judge believed the jury’s decision was against the greater weight of 
the evidence.196  Juries in pre-revolutionary America possessed 
virtually unlimited power to determine both law and fact.197  Judges 
were often relegated to deciding pretrial motions and other 
ministerial matters.198  In Georgia, for example, the juries of the 
county superior courts decided issues of law and fact, turning to 
judges only when they desired advice.199  Decisions of the superior 
courts could be appealed to special juries, not to a supreme court.200  
By placing such power in juries, the community could control the 
content of substantive law.  A legislature could pass a statute and a 
judge could instruct on the common law, but juries possessed the 
power to veto both. 
 
 194. ADAMS, supra note 188, at 269–70. 
 195. WOOD, supra note 181, at 161; AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION 234 
(2005) (“Juries were, in a sense, the people themselves, tried-and-true embodiments of late-
eighteenth-century republican ideology.”). 
 196. FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 85, 289 (1985). 
 197. WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF COMMON LAW 28–29 (1975); WILFRED J. 
RITZ, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789, at 30 (Wythe Holt  & L.H. LaRue 
eds., 1990).  Also noteworthy is the jury charge of Chief Justice John Jay in Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 
U.S. (3 Dall.) 1, 4 (1794) (instructing the jury that it had dominion over “the law as well as the fact 
in controversy”). 
 198. NELSON, supra note 197, at 28–29. 
 199. MAIN, supra note 185, at 171–72. 
 200. Id. 
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Similarly, the people did not trust judges to rule on the 
constitutionality of legislation.201 Juries implicitly possessed this 
power, and some states also employed councils of revision to 
determine whether the legislature had deviated from its delegated 
powers.  In Pennsylvania, the council of censors, which served as a 
council of revision, was chosen every seven years by the people.202  
Based on a vote of two-thirds of the censors, a state constitutional 
convention could be summoned to correct constitutional abuses or 
mistakes.203 Popular control of the judiciary was also evident in states 
requiring judges to stand for reelection,204 and states that permitted 
judges to serve for good behavior often gave the legislature control 
over judicial salaries and provided for simple procedures to remove 
judges.205 
B. The Judiciary at the Philadelphia Convention 
By 1787, most Americans agreed that the judiciary should be a 
separate and independent branch of government; therefore, the 
delegates to the Philadelphia Convention insisted on an independent 
judiciary.  Blackstone had taught that the “distinct and separate 
existence of the judicial power, in a particular body of men, 
nominated indeed, but not removable at pleasure, by the crown, 
 
 201. MCDONALD, supra note 196, at 85; see also Matthew P. Harrington, Judicial Review 
Before John Marshall, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51, 53 (2003) (“Indeed, the judiciary was held in 
rather low esteem throughout the colonial period, and thus the idea that judges would ultimately 
determine the constitutionality of legislation would have been unthinkable.”); AMAR, supra note 
195, at 207 (noting that aside from Connecticut and Rhode Island where the colonists named 
their own judges, “only three of the other fifty men who signed the Declaration of Independence 
held notable positions on the colonial bench”). 
 202. MCDONALD, supra note 196, at 153. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
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consists one main preservative of the public liberty . . . .”206 
Accordingly, the ninth resolution of the Virginia Plan called for 
creation of a national judiciary with judges holding office “during 
good behavior” and prohibiting increases or diminutions in salary 
“made so as to affect the persons actually in office at the time of such 
increase of diminution.”207  On the motion of Gouverneur Morris, 
the delegates struck the language prohibiting the increase in 
salaries.208  Benjamin Franklin observed that the possibility of 
inflation or increased judicial duties counseled in favor of the 
authority to increase the pay of judges.209  The motion passed with 
only Virginia and North Carolina voting against it.210  Thus, the 
Framers created a judiciary independent of the other two branches. 
Judicial review, a subject of much debate today, was barely 
mentioned at the Convention.  Most of the debate regarding the 
judiciary centered on who would choose the judges: Congress, the 
Senate, the president, or some combination thereof.  The few 
references we do have to judicial review are in connection with a 
proposed council of revision.  The eighth resolution of the Virginia 
Plan recommended that the executive and “a convenient number of 
the National Judiciary, ought to compose a Council of revision with 
authority to examine every act of the National Legislature before it 
shall operate.”211 
After the delegates agreed to a single executive, they turned to the 
proposed council of revision.  Elbridge Gerry objected to the 
 
 206. BLACKSTONE, supra note 49, at *269. 
 207. JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 32 
(W.W. Norton & Co.. 1966) (1840). 
 208. Id. at 317–18. 
 209. Id. at 318. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. at 32. 
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inclusion of the judiciary in the council because “they will have a 
sufficient check against encroachments on their own department by 
their exposition of the laws, which involved a power of deciding on 
their Constitutionality.”  Gerry continued by observing that “[i]n 
some States the Judges had actually set aside laws as being against the 
Constitution.  This was done too with general approbation.”212 
Gerry feared that the proposed council of revision would 
establish judges “as the guardians of the Rights of the people”—a 
dangerous proposition in his view.213  To protect the rights of the 
people, he preferred to rely “on the Representatives of the people as 
the guardians of their Rights & interests.”214  Gerry’s rejection of a 
guardianship role for courts coupled with his earlier comments about 
a check on encroachments “on their own department” indicate a 
narrow notion of judicial review.  For example, laws limiting rights to 
jury trial would come within the scope of the judicial department and 
the judges could presumably rule on the laws’ constitutionality.  But 
it is unclear whether this power of review would be permissible for 
statutes dealing with other matters, such as laws establishing 
qualifications for electors.  While Gerry’s words indicate a narrow 
understanding of judicial review, there is not enough evidence to 
draw a conclusion one way or the other. 
Luther Martin echoed Gerry’s broad sentiments that judges—
separate and distinct from the council—had the power to rule on the 
constitutionality of laws, but Martin made no distinction about their 
own department.  “In this character” (as judicial officials), Martin 
noted, “they will have a negative on the laws.”215 
 
 212. Id. at 61. 
 213. Id. at 338. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. at 340. 
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Rufus King agreed with Gerry’s misgivings about composition of 
the council and cited separation-of-powers concerns.  “Judges ought 
to be able to expound the law as it should come to them,” King 
averred, “free from the bias of having participated in its 
formation.”216  Madison countered that participation in the council 
would “enable the Judiciary Department the better to defend itself 
against Legislative encroachments,” while at the same time shoring 
up the executive.217  Judicial self-defense hints at a narrower 
understanding of judicial review, with judges exercising this power to 
defend their constitutional functions. 
Madison believed that the additional check in the council was 
needed because of the “tendency in the Legislature to absorb all 
power into its vortex.”218  He also argued that a veto in any branch 
other than the legislative violated pure separation-of-powers 
principles, and thus the separation of powers was not a valid 
objection to the judges’ participation in the council.  George Mason 
agreed with Madison, noting that “[t]he Executive power ought to be 
well secured against Legislative usurpations on it.”219 He also 
observed that when ruling from the bench judges “could impede in 
one case only, the operation of law.”220  Sitting on the council, judges 
could have a say on every unjust law and affect more than just a 
single case. 
Hugh Williamson of North Carolina supported Madison and 
Mason on judicial inclusion in the council.  Articulating a sweeping 
understanding of judicial review, he noted that “[t]he judiciary ought 
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 218. Id. at 338. 
 219. Id. at 81. 
 220. Id. at 341. 
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to have an opportunity of remonstrating against projected 
encroachments on the people as well as themselves.”221  He 
recognized that in interpreting laws the judges “would have an 
opportunity of defending their constitutional rights.”  But, in his 
opinion, this was not enough.  “Laws may be unjust, may be unwise, 
may be dangerous, may be destructive[],” Williamson observed, “and 
yet may not be so unconstitutional as to justify the Judges in refusing 
to give them effect.”222  Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut also spoke in 
favor of the judicial inclusion, noting that it would give more 
“firmness to the Executive,” and it would give an additional 
opportunity for the judiciary to defend itself.223 
Despite forceful arguments for creating a council of revision 
composed of judges and the executive, the eighth resolution of the 
Virginia Plan was defeated.  The debate is instructive on the 
delegates’ views on the judiciary.  Without question, the fact that 
delegates did offer opinions on the matter contemplates a form of 
judicial review.224 When deciding an actual case or controversy, they 
expected the judges to strike unconstitutional laws.  The purpose of 
this power was two-fold: (1) for the judges to defend their 
constitutional sphere, and (2) for the judges to defend the rights of 
the people.  But defense of the people should not be overstated.  For 
instance, although Gerry applauded judicial review, he made clear 
that representatives were better defenders of the people’s liberties, 
and his comments contemplated the judiciary defending its 
constitutional prerogatives rather than striking all sorts of legislative 
 
 221. Id. at 336. 
 222. Id. at 337. 
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 224. MCDONALD, supra note 196, at 254. 
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enactments.  Most likely the idea of frequent elections played into 
Gerry’s thinking here. 
In setting boundaries of judicial review, Hugh Williamson 
articulated what we know as the doubtful case rule,225 which instructs 
that a court should not negate an act of the legislature unless the act 
is a blatant violation of the Constitution.  If there is any doubt about 
the legitimacy of a statute, it should be resolved in favor of the 
people’s representatives by permitting the law to stand.  Close calls 
are not the business of the judiciary.  Williamson’s remarks indicate 
that the Framers had some understanding of the threat of “judicial 
activism” and expected the judiciary to exercise power in modest 
fashion. 
Discussion of judicial review is also found in debates regarding 
state veto.  The sixth resolve of the Virginia Plan gave Congress a 
veto on “all laws passed by the several States contravening in the 
opinion of the National Legislature the articles of Union.”226  On the 
motion of Benjamin Franklin, the delegates added to the end of the 
clause: “or any treaties subsisting under the authority of the 
Union.”227  Charles Pinckney of South Carolina wanted to broaden 
the veto power to all state laws that Congress believed to be 
improper.”228  Madison seconded the motion, noting that such a veto 
was “absolutely necessary to a perfect system.”229  Madison feared 
that without a legislative veto “the only remedy will lie in an appeal to 
coercion.”230  Gerry and others opposed this measure, observing that 
 
 225. SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 60 (1990). 
 226. MADISON, supra note 207, at 31. 
 227. Id. at 44. 
 228. Id. at 88. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
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a national government with such a power “may enslave the States.”231  
Gouverneur Morris feared that the proposed negative “would disgust 
all the States.”232  Morris believed that the proposal was also 
unnecessary because an unconstitutional law would “be set aside in 
the Judiciary department.”233  Pinckney’s motion ultimately failed by 
the vote of seven states to three. 
Upon the rejection of the proposed negative, Luther Martin of 
Maryland suggested a supremacy clause: 
that the Legislative acts of the U.S. made by virtue & in pursuance 
of the articles of Union, and all Treaties made & ratified under 
the authority of the U.S. shall be the supreme law of the 
respective States, as far as those acts or treaties shall relate to the 
said States, or their Citizens and inhabitants—& that the 
Judiciaries of the several States shall be bound thereby in their 
decisions, any thing in the respective laws of the individual States 
to the contrary notwithstanding.234 
This was clearly meant as an alternative to the negative, and there 
was very little debate on the clause.  The committee of detail changed 
Martin’s phraseology from “the Judiciaries of the several States” to 
“the judges in the several States.”235  This excluded juries from the 
supremacy clause and made clear that the clause applied to national 
as well as state judges.236  The committee made other revisions, 
including changing “supreme law of the respective states” to 
“supreme law of the land.”237  Without question, the supremacy 
clause contemplated federal and state judges reviewing the 
 
 231. Id. at 89. 
 232. Id. at 305. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. at 305–06 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 235. Id. at 390. 
 236. MCDONALD, supra note 196, at 255. 
 237. MADISON, supra note 207, at 626. 
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constitutionality of legislative enactments because the judges were 
bound by “the supreme law of the land.”  The Constitution required 
them to exercise judgment on  what constituted supreme law and 
thus contemplated judicial review. 
After the Philadelphia Convention, Alexander Hamilton in 
Federalist No. 78 offered a defense of the power of judicial review 
under the proposed Constitution.  Hamilton began with the 
proposition that an act contrary to Congress’s enumerated powers is 
void.238  Hamilton viewed the people as the ultimate sovereigns who 
would be expressing their will by adopting the Constitution.239  The 
people’s Constitution would thus be superior to statutory law.240  If 
Congress could pass a law outside of its delegated powers, Hamilton 
reasoned, this would show “that the deputy is greater than his 
principal . . . .”241 
Hamilton focused on the fact that the proposed Constitution 
placed written limits on government power, something unknown 
under the British constitution.242  These limitations, he argued, could 
be preserved only in “the courts of justice; whose duty it must be to 
declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the constitution 
void.”243 To Hamilton, courts served as an “intermediate body 
between the people and the legislature . . . to keep the latter within 
the limits assigned to their authority.”244  This judicial power did not 
 
 238. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 130, at 398. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. at 397. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. at 398. 
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place the judiciary above the legislature, Hamilton averred, but rather 
put the people above both.245 
In sum, the approval of judicial review as expressed by many 
delegates to the Philadelphia Convention is consistent with the 
evolution of sovereignty in American thinking.  Under the British 
constitution, Parliament could make or unmake any law as it saw fit.  
Although courts interpreted parliamentary enactments, a court could 
not declare an act of Parliament void.  By 1787, most persons in 
America agreed that it was the people who possessed ultimate 
sovereignty.  Hence, the delegates understood that the courts would 
play a role unknown to the British system.  No longer did a particular 
branch of government hold ultimate power.  Certainly the legislative 
branch predominated, but with a written Constitution all three 
branches were charged with interpreting the document.  Hence, a 
form of judicial review was a natural outcome of the Revolution and 
was expected by the Philadelphia delegates. 
C. Early Exercises of Judicial Review 
The American theory of sovereignty, as well as the debates of the 
delegates to the Philadelphia Convention, support the idea of judicial 
review. Debates and theory, however, are no substitute for an 
examination of actual practice in American courts during these 
formative years.  The decision whether to exercise judicial review 
ultimately rested with the courts.  Early state court decisions are 
especially instructive on the evolution of the idea of judicial review.  
These decisions demonstrate how judges struggled with the exercise 
of judicial review in light of their education and experience with 
parliamentary sovereignty.  Accordingly, what follows is an 
 
 245. Id. 
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examination of early state case law in which a court, or a judge of the 
court, either discussed the doctrine of judicial review or actually 
exercised judicial review.246  These cases provide needed background 
to the famous Marbury v. Madison decision and place the decision 
and its reasoning in proper historical context. 
1. Commonwealth v. Caton247 
Caton dealt with a pardon granted to three loyalists by the 
Virginia House of Delegates.248 Under Virginia’s Treason Act of 
1776, the power of pardon in such cases was transferred from the 
executive to the legislature.249  In Caton, the house granted the 
pardon for the loyalists and referred the matter to the senate for 
concurrence, but the senate thought the prisoners unworthy of 
clemency and voted to deny a pardon.250 
The prisoners filed a petition contending that the drafters of the 
Treason Act erred in giving the power to pardon to “the general 
assembly” because the text of the Virginia Constitution explicitly 
vested the power to pardon in the House of Delegates in certain 
cases.251  The petition further contended that in the face of this 
inconsistency, the state constitution must control the issuance of a 
 
 246. Not included in this discussion are opinions that offered little or no analysis for their 
actions. The reason for the dearth of such decisions likely rests with the fact that very few judges 
actually wrote opinions in the 1780s and because juries, not judges, typically exercised the power 
to strike down a law.  See RITZ, supra note 197, at 30, 36. 
 247. 8 Va. (4 Call) 5 (1782). For the ease of the reader, pinpoint citations will be to the 
Westlaw citation: 1782 WL 5 (Va. Nov., 1782). A firsthand account of the case from a 
participating judge, including portion of the case’s text, is reprinted in EDMUND PENDLETON, 
Account of “The Case of the Prisoners,” in 2 THE LETTERS AND PAPERS OF EDMUND PENDLETON 
1734–1803, at 416–27 (David Johnson Mays ed., 1967). 
 248. Caton, 1782 WL 5, at *1. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. 
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pardon, thus voiding the Treason Act.252  The attorney general 
countered that the provisions of the state constitution did not run 
counter to the Treason Act; thus, as a validly enacted statute, the 
Treason Act controlled, and the putative pardon was invalid because 
the upper house had failed to concur as required by the Act.253 
Judge George Wythe, who would later be a delegate to the 
Philadelphia Convention, began the opinion by noting that it was his 
duty to protect the senate and the community against usurpations 
from the house.254  In dealing with the other branches, Wythe saw 
definitive bounds to the scope of permissible legislative conduct, 
promising to inform the house that “here is the limit of your 
authority; and, hither, shall you go, but no further.”255 Wythe 
ultimately concluded that the state constitution permitted the house 
to issue pardons without consent of the senate only in cases of 
impeachment prosecuted by the house.256  Because this was not an 
impeachment case, the house’s pardon of the loyalists was 
insufficient.257 
Writing separately, the President of the Virginia Supreme Court 
of Appeals, Judge Edmund Pendleton, remarked that Virginia was 
different from the countries of Europe because it had a written 
constitution adopted by its citizens as “their social compact.”258  
Pendleton believed that the separation of powers found in the 
Virginia Constitution required each branch of the government to 
 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
 254. See id. at *2. 
 255. Id. 
 256. See id. at *4. 
 257. Id. at *4–5. 
 258. Id. at *6. 
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stay within its delegated powers.259  For Pendleton, this 
constitutionally mandated separation of powers introduced the 
concept of judicial review, but he was less cavalier than Judge Wythe 
in touting the power of the judiciary: 
But how far this court, in whom the judiciary powers may be in 
some sort said to be concentrated, shall have power to declare the 
nullity of a law passed in its forms by the legislative power, 
without exercising the power of that branch, contrary to the plain 
terms of that constitution, is indeed a deep, important, and I will 
add, tremendous question . . . . I am happy in being of opinion 
there is no occasion to consider it upon this occasion; and still 
more happy in the hope that the wisdom and prudence of the 
legislature will prevent the disagreeable necessity of ever deciding 
it, by suggesting the propriety of making the principles of the 
constitution the great rule to direct the spirit of their laws.260 
Pendleton ultimately agreed with Wythe’s interpretation of the 
constitution and Treason Act, also finding the pardon was invalid.261  
This view carried the day by a vote of six judges to two.262 
Although Caton does not provide a great deal of analysis, and any 
of its statements on the power of courts to strike an act of the 
legislature are dicta, the Pendleton and Wythe opinions are 
nonetheless valuable because of their pioneering nature.  Wythe 
believed that the judiciary had the power to instruct the other two 
branches on the scope of their powers—something unheard of in the 
British system.  He also thought it his duty as a judge to protect both 
the people and the other branches of the government from 
“encroachments.”263 He emphatically wrote that he would not 
 
 259. Id. at *7. 
 260. Id. 
 261. See id. at *9. 
 262. PENDLETON, supra note 247, at 426. 
 263. Caton, 1782 WL 5, at *2. 
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hesitate to chastise a branch of the legislature for overreaching its 
powers.264 While Wythe obviously rejected the British doctrine that 
only the legislature can interpret the constitution, he stopped short of 
discussing the scope of judicial review. 
In contrast to Wythe’s opinion, Pendleton approached judicial 
review much more cautiously.  Pendleton recognized that Wythe was 
entering uncharted waters by chastising the legislature. He 
understood that a court arguably assumed a legislative function when 
it declared a statute unconstitutional, and such an action was 
arguably in violation of the Virginia Constitution.  Although 
Pendleton did not rule judicial review out of bounds, he preferred 
that a court refrain from intervening unless and until the legislature 
gave the court no other option.265 
2. Rutgers v. Waddington (1784)266 
Rutgers involved a challenge to a New York statute known as the 
Trespass Act, which was passed as a remedy for property owners 
whose property had been occupied and/or taken after they fled New 
York during the American Revolution.267  In essence, the statute 
authorized the owners to file actions seeking compensation from the 
British authorities and citizens who had occupied their property 
during and after the Revolutionary War.268 The Trespass Act 
 
 264. Id. 
 265. See PENDLETON, supra note 247, at 422–23. 
 266. Rutgers v. Waddington is not found in any case reporter. However, it has been reprinted 
along with case briefs and other materials in 1 THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER 
HAMILTON 282–419 (Julius Goebel, Jr. ed., 1964). The entirety of the decision is reprinted at 392–
419. 
 267. See id. at 289–90. 
 268. See id. at 287–89. 
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specifically prohibited the pleading of military orders as a defense to 
suit, a prohibition contrary to customary international law.269 
In 1776, Elizabeth Rutgers fled her brew house located on Maiden 
Lane when New York City was captured by the British, and her 
abandoned property was confiscated for the use of the army by the 
British commissary and was subsequently given to Benjamin 
Waddington and Evelyn Pierrepont.270  Waddington and Pierrepont 
improved the brewery and enjoyed rent-free use of the property for 
three years, until May 1, 1780, when a British commander decreed 
that they pay £150 per year to the Vestry for the Poor.271 Shortly 
thereafter, on June 20, 1783, the same British commander ordered 
them to pay rent to Rutgers’s son retroactive to May 1, 1783.272  In the 
winter of 1783 a fire broke out and destroyed the brewery and its 
improvements.273  Pursuant to the Trespass Act, Rutgers brought suit 
for £8,000 back rent, causing “the greatest excitement” in the city.274 
Alexander Hamilton represented Waddington and Pierrepont 
and argued that the Trespass Act was inconsistent with a settled 
principle of the law of nations, namely that a conqueror has the right 
to use property under the conqueror’s control.275  This and other 
principles of international law had been incorporated into the New 
York Constitution; thus, the Trespass Act violated provisions of the 
Treaty of Paris by waiving private damages “in consequence of or in 
any wise relating to the war.”276 In briefing the issues for the courts, 
 
 269. Id. at 296. 
 270. Id. at 289. 
 271. Id. at 290. 
 272. See id. at 290–91. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. at 291. 
 275. Id. at 298–99. 
 276. Id. at 299. 
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Hamilton cited to Dr. Bonham’s Case, arguing that “[a] statute 
against Law and reason[,] especially if a private statute[,] is void.”277 
In later briefs, Hamilton went further, arguing that the result would 
be the same even if “the legislature intended the results of the Act.”278  
Thus, it appears that Hamilton rejected Blackstone’s explanation of 
Dr. Bonham’s Case, considering it a mere exercise in statutory 
interpretation (narrowly construing a statute that contradicts 
established legal principles to avoid an absurd result).279 
After hearing the case, Judge James Duane issued a carefully 
crafted opinion which held that the Trespass Act need not and 
should not be interpreted to interfere with the law of nations.280  In 
essence, he split the baby by holding that the law of nations served as 
a defense when it pertained to orders of the British commander, but 
not when it pertained to orders of officials of the British 
commissary.281  Rutgers could recover damages for the years 1777 to 
1780, when the property was held pursuant to the commissary’s 
orders, but not 1780 forward, when the property was held pursuant 
to the commander’s orders.  In short, the judge rejected the 
defendant’s treaty argument in toto.282 
Most important for our purposes, Judge Duane declined to adopt 
Hamilton’s broad arguments about the power of courts to strike a 
legislative enactment as against law and reason.  Relying on 
Blackstone, Judge Duane did not deign to directly challenge 
legislative supremacy: 
 
 277. Id. at 357. 
 278. Id. at 382. 
 279. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 280. 1 THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 266, at 405, 414. 
 281. See id. at 412–13. 
 282. See id. 
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The supremacy of the Legislative need not be called into question; 
if they think fit positively to enact a law, there is no power which 
can controul [sic] them.  When the main object of such a law is 
clearly expressed, and the intention manifest, the judges are not 
at liberty, altho’[sic] it appears unreasonable, to reject it: for this 
were to set the judicial above the legislative, which would be 
subversive of all government.283 
Like Blackstone, Judge Duane observed that judges could resort 
to equity in expounding a statute when it was clear that the 
legislature had not foreseen the absurd consequences.284  Such 
equitable interpretation merely effectuated the intent of the 
legislature and therefore did not result in judicial ascendancy.285  
Armed with the canons of statutory construction, Judge Duane ruled 
that the legislature could not have intended to repeal the law of 
nations with the Trespass Act; hence, orders of the British 
commander did, in fact, provide a defense.286 
Judge Duane exercised some legal gymnastics to reach this result, 
possibly in anticipation of the pending political maelstrom.  On the 
heels of his widely reported decision, an open letter appeared in the 
New York Packet and American Advertiser.287 Melancton Smith and 
other influential New Yorkers noted that a power in the courts to 
control the legislature would be “absurd in itself,” for the job of the 
courts was “to declare the laws, not to alter them.”288  When courts 
strike down an act of the legislature, the letter continued, they violate 
principles of separation of powers and endanger the liberties of the 
 
 283. Id. at 415. 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. 
 286. See id. at 412–14, 416. 
 287. Id. at 313–14. 
 288. Id. at 314. 
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people.289  In addition to incurring the ire of Smith and his followers, 
Duane’s efforts at statutory construction also incurred a stern rebuke 
from the legislature and a threat of impeachment.290 
With the benefit of hindsight, the threats and stinging criticism of 
Duane’s opinion seem misplaced: he did not strike down a statute, 
nor did he claim such a power.  His opinion was true to Blackstone’s 
writings and in line with American respect for the legislative 
branch.291  While Judge Duane did not accept Hamilton’s theory of 
judicial review, his method of statutory construction defeated the 
legislative purpose of full compensation for patriots, and thus started 
a political firestorm.  The public response to his decision revealed 
much distrust of judicial power and the preference for legislative 
power.  New Yorkers were not yet ready to expand the power of their 
courts. 
3. Trevett v. Weeden (1786)292 
Trevett arose out of legislation passed by the Rhode Island 
General Assembly authorizing the issuance of paper money.293 To 
compel acceptance of paper money, the General Assembly passed a 
Forcing Act that levied fines on persons refusing to accept paper and 
on persons contributing to the depreciation of the paper currency’s 
value.294  Alleged violators could be tried without a jury in special 
court and had no right to appeal.295  Weeden violated the paper 
 
 289. Id. 
 290. KRAMER, supra note 81, at 66–67. 
 291. See, e.g., 1 THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 266, at 414. 
 292. Trevett v. Weeden is an unpublished case—accounts appeared only in newspapers and 
pamphlets of the time.  The best written account of the case is in PATRICK T. CONLEY, THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF TREVETT V. WEEDEN (1786) (1976). 
 293. Id. at 2. 
 294. Id. at 3. 
 295. Id. 
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money statute when he refused to accept paper currency from John 
Trevett.296  Rather than apply to a special court, Trevett complained 
to the superior court of judicature (the highest court in the state), 
which heard arguments on September 22, 1786.297 
Weeden challenged the statutory scheme on three grounds: (1) 
early expiration of the statute because of a drafting error, (2) denial 
of appellate rights, and (3) denial of the right to a jury trial.298 
Weeden specifically argued that the court could strike the law as 
unconstitutional, stating that “‘[t]he Legislature derives all its 
authority from the constitution—has no power of making laws but in 
subordination to it—cannot infringe or violate it.’”299  Despite this 
strong language, the Court ultimately dismissed the complaint 
against Weeden because the action was not brought in a special court 
as commanded by statute and consequently did “‘not come under 
cognizance of the Justices.’”300 
The General Assembly jumped on the content of the court’s 
decision and demanded that the judges appear to explain their 
reasons for declaring “‘an act of the supreme legislature of this state 
to be unconstitutional, and so absolutely void.’”301  Judges David 
Howell, Joseph Hazard, and Thomas Tillinghast appeared before the 
Assembly, and each defended his decision.302  Judge Howell, in his 
bold speech, stated that the court did not rule the statute 
unconstitutional, but he added that the legislature had no business 
 
 296. Id. 
 297. Id. 
 298. Id. at 3, 6. 
 299. Id. at 7. 
 300. Id. 
 301. Id. at  8. 
 302. Id. 
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interfering with the propriety of judicial decisions.303  If such second 
guessing was tolerated, “‘the legislature would become the supreme 
judiciary—a perversion of power totally subversive of civil liberty.’”304  
The legislature was not fully comforted by the explanation and 
considered dismissing the judges from office, but it ultimately 
relented.305  However, the legislature did not forget Judge Howell’s 
controversial speech favoring judicial review.  At the expiration of 
the judges’ terms of office the next year, the legislature declined to 
reelect four of the five involved in the Trevett case.306 
Although the Rhode Island judges did not actually exercise the 
power of judicial review in the case, counsel for Weeden urged the 
court to exercise such a power.307  Had the case been brought in the 
proper court, though, the outcome might have been different given 
Judge Howell’s belief that the statute in question was 
unconstitutional.  The conflict between the branches was impossible 
to ignore; nonetheless, the scales still tilted against the judiciary.  The 
judges stared down the attempt at legislative intimidation, but the 
legislature responded with a show of force.  The Legislature flexed its 
power by threatening impeachment and dismissing four of the five 
judges even though the judges had stopped short of asserting judicial 
review.  Rhode Island, like New York in the Rutgers v. Waddington 
case, was not prepared to accept expansion of the judiciary’s power. 
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4. Bayard v. Singleton308 
Bayard also pertained to property that had been confiscated in 
the Revolutionary War.309  By statute, the North Carolina legislature 
directed that title claims to confiscated property were to be dismissed 
if the current owner produced an affidavit indicating that the 
property had been purchased from the commissioner of forfeited 
estates.310  When the plaintiff brought an action to recover a house, 
wharf, and other property, the defendant produced a proper affidavit 
and asked that the suit be dismissed.311  The plaintiff countered that 
summary dismissal per the statute deprived him of his constitutional 
right to a jury trial and it was therefore void.312 
The judges expressed reluctance to dispute the wisdom of the 
legislature, but the solemnity of their oaths compelled them to 
examine the validity of the statute.313  The court began by noting that 
every citizen had a right to a trial by jury in cases of disputed title to 
property.314  This constitutional requirement put a limit on the 
extensive powers of the legislative branch.  If a legislature had the 
authority to take away the fundamental right of a jury trial, they 
would also have the power to transform the character of state 
government from republican to monarchical.315 The judiciary, being 
“bound to take notice of [the constitution] as much as of any other 
 
 308. 1 N.C. (Mart) 5 (1787). For the ease of the reader, pinpoint citations will be to the 
Westlaw citation: 1787 WL 6 (N.C. Super. Ct. Law & Eq. Nov., 1787). 
 309. Id. at *1. 
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law,” could not permit such a result.316  “Accordingly, the court 
ordered that the case be tried by a jury . . .” because the act of the 
legislature was without effect.317 
Undoubtedly, the Bayard court exercised judicial review over an 
act of the legislature, although it did not call it such.  While it cannot 
be characterized as an act of statutory construction in the tradition of 
Dr. Bonham’s Case, the Bayard judges recognized that the legislature 
was not the ultimate sovereign of the state.318  The court specifically 
noted that it could “take notice” of the constitution, parting ways 
with the British notion that the constitution was exclusively in the 
orbit of the legislative branch.319  Because a jury trial was 
fundamental to a system of ordered liberty, the court was required to 
strike down the offending statute. 
5. Ham v. McClaws320 
In late 1788, a family of British settlers left the Bay of Honduras 
for South Carolina.321 Prior to leaving Honduras, the settlers 
researched South Carolina law to determine whether they could 
safely bring their seven slaves into the state.322 The research revealed 
no prohibition, but during the voyage the state legislature passed a 
law prohibiting foreigners, on penalty of forfeiture, from importing 
slaves into South Carolina.323  The statute also provided that the 
 
 316. Id. at *3. 
 317. Id. 
 318. See id. 
 319. See id. 
 320. 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 93 (1789). For the ease of the reader, pinpoint citations will be to the 
Westlaw citation: 1789 WL 140 (S.C. Ct. Com. Pl. & Gen. Sess. Oct. 30, 1789). 
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forfeited slaves would be given to the person reporting the slaves’ 
illegal entry into the state.324 
Upon the settlers’ entry into South Carolina, a revenue officer 
brought suit under the statute to claim the forfeited slaves.325  The 
settlers challenged the statute’s constitutionality, citing Dr. Bonham’s 
Case and arguing that this particular inequitable result could never 
have been contemplated by the legislature.326  They had not 
intentionally violated the statute and could not have learned of its 
passage while in transit.327  Hence, the real “intention of the 
legislature[] must have been to exempt those negroes from forfeiture, 
who were upon the way, or on the point of arriving in the State, 
under the sanction of former law, when the latter act passed.”328 
In a one-paragraph opinion, the court agreed with the settlers.329  
“It is clear,” held the court, “that statutes passed against the plain and 
obvious principles of common right, and common reason, are 
absolutely null and void, as far as they are calculated to operate 
against those principles.”330  Because the wise and just General 
Assembly “never had it in their contemplation to make a forfeiture of 
the negroes in question,” the court construed the statute to deny a 
forfeiture.331 
Broadly reading the opinion, one could argue that the court 
struck down the statute as applied to the settlers, and in doing so 
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exercised the power of judicial review.  More likely, the court simply 
exercised the rules of statutory construction as Coke did in Dr. 
Bonham’s Case and as Judge Duane did with the Trespass Act in 
Rutgers.  The court simply did not believe the legislature could have 
intended the forfeiture under the circumstances presented.  Because 
the Ham opinion is so brief, further speculation on the intent of the 
court is difficult. 
6. Bowman v. Middleton332 
Bowman concerned a 1712 act of the South Carolina General 
Assembly transferring a freehold from one holder and his heirs to 
another. . . .333  The court’s reported opinion is very short: 
The Court, (present, GRIMKE and BAY, justices) who after a full 
consideration on the subject were clearly of opinion, that the 
plaintiffs could claim no title under the act in question, as it was 
against common right, as well as against Magna Charta, to take 
away the freehold of one man, and vest it in another; and that 
too, to the prejudice of third persons, without any compensation, 
or even a trial by jury of the country to determine the right in 
question.  That the act was therefore, ipso facto, void.  That no 
length of time could give it validity, being originally founded on 
erroneous principles.  That the parties however might, if they 
chose, rely upon a possessory right, if they could establish it.334 
Like the Ham opinion before it, the Bowman opinion lacks 
analysis.  However, the language used regarding common right and 
reason is likely taken from Dr. Bonham’s Case.  The South Carolina 
court apparently interpreted that case as providing supporting 
authority for its holding.  But because there was no citation to Dr. 
Bonham’s Case, nor a discussion of it, we can only speculate about 
 
 332. 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 252 (1792). For the ease of the reader, pinpoint citations will be to the 
Westlaw citation: 1792 WL 207 (S.C. Ct. Com. Pl. & Gen. Sess. May, 1792). 
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Justices Grimke’s and Bay’s understanding of this English precedent.  
We do not know whether they viewed Dr. Bonham’s Case as resting 
on a rule of statutory construction or whether they viewed it as 
establishing judicial authority over acts of an elected assembly. 
Because of the brevity of the opinion, Bowman raises more questions 
than answers about early American attitude toward judicial review.   
7. Kamper v. Hawkins335 
Kamper involved the constitutionality of a Virginia statute giving 
state general court judges the equitable jurisdiction to grant 
injunctions and to hear suits commenced by injunction.336  Prior to 
the statute in question, such jurisdiction was reserved for the state 
chancery court.337  The statute was challenged on grounds that it 
circumvented constitutional provisions requiring that judges be 
appointed by the joint ballot of both houses of legislature, followed 
by an executive commission for good behavior.338  All five judges who 
heard the case issued separate opinions on the propriety of judicial 
review and the validity of the statute. 
Judge Nelson began his opinion by observing that the legislative 
houses “derive their existence from the Constitution.”339  It thus 
followed that the legislature cannot alter the document—such power, 
in Judge Nelson’s view, resided in the people of Virginia.340  He 
candidly admitted that some Virginians believed that the judiciary 
assumed the power of the legislature or placed itself above the 
 
 335. 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20 (Va. 1793). For the ease of the reader, pinpoint citations will be to 
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legislature when exercising judicial review.341  In response to this 
objection, Judge Nelson averred that he did not consider the 
judiciary to be “champions of the people, or the Constitution, bound 
to sound the alarm” when the legislature exceeded its powers.342  But, 
if the courts were presented with actual cases or controversies 
between litigants, the courts were bound to rule.343 This review of 
legislation, Judge Nelson asserted, was no “novelty.”344  He observed 
that often “one statute is virtually repealed by another, and the 
judiciary must decide which is the law, or whether both can exist 
together.”345  After this discussion of judicial review, Judge Nelson 
held that that statute was unconstitutional because it attempted to 
overturn constitutional requirements for the appointment of 
judges.346 
Next, Judge Spencer Roane considered the statute.  Judge Roane 
began by observing that the case had originated in his court and that 
he had referred it to the general court because of the issue’s import.347  
He further commented that in the lower court he had “doubted how 
far the judiciary were authorized to refuse to execute a law, on the 
ground of its being against the spirit of the Constitution.”348  On 
further reflection, Judge Roane noted, he had changed his opinion: “I 
now think that the judiciary may and ought not only to refuse to 
execute a law expressly repugnant to the Constitution; but also one 
which is, by a plain and natural construction, in opposition to the 
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fundamental principles thereof.”349  In other words, the judiciary 
should strike laws violating express provisions and those violating 
the spirit of the document.  In support of his new opinion, Judge 
Roane declared that the people were “the only sovereign” power and 
that the legislature was subordinate to them and the constitution.350  
It naturally followed that the legislature could not alter by mere 
statute the constitution’s procedure for appointing judges.351  To hold 
otherwise would permit the legislature to infringe upon the 
constitution “and the liberties of the people” would be “wholly at the 
mercy of the legislature.”352 Having established the principles of 
judicial review, Judge Roane agreed that the statute was repugnant to 
the constitution. 
Judge Henry began his opinion by observing that the issue before 
the court was both delicate and important.353  He then recounted 
some history of the Revolution and turned to founding principles.354  
Prior to the Revolution, Judge Henry observed, Americans were 
“taught that Parliament was omnipotent, and their powers beyond 
control.”355  With the Virginia Constitution, this legislative power 
was limited because the constitution was “founded on the authority 
of the people.”356  Turning to the statute, Judge Henry could not 
reconcile it with the constitutional provisions for judicial 
appointments.357 To uphold the statute, he observed, “would be a 
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solecism in government—establishing the will of the legislature, 
servants of the people, to control the will of their masters.”358  Such 
an outcome could not be permitted.359 
Judge Tyler was the fourth judge to deliver an opinion in 
Kamper.360  Like his colleagues, he led off with fundamentals.361 He 
observed that the Constitution was a “great contract of the people” 
and was thus “paramount law.”362  He doubted that any branch of 
government could lawfully ignore the enumerated rights of the 
people or the plan of government outlined in the constitution.363  If 
one branch did choose to violate the Constitution, it should not 
expect assistance from another branch “to aid in the violation of this 
sacred letter.”364  He reminded his colleagues that Parliament’s claim 
of supreme power was “an abominable insult upon the honour and 
good sense of our country.”365  In post-revolutionary Virginia, only 
“the God of Heaven and our constitution” could claim true 
omnipotence.366  Based upon these principles, Judge Tyler declared it 
his duty to rule upon the constitutionality of statutes that were 
presented in cases and controversies.367  Recognizing the nature of 
this power, he noted that the alleged “violation must be plain and 
clear, or there might be a danger of the judiciary preventing the 
operation of laws which might be productive of much public 
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good.”368 Upon consideration of the extension of equity jurisdiction, 
Judge Tyler concurred that the statute circumvented constitutional 
provisions requiring judges be appointed by the joint ballot of both 
houses of legislature followed by an executive commission for good 
behavior.369 
The last opinion was delivered by Judge St. George Tucker.370  In 
determining the source of ultimate power, Tucker looked to the 
people and described them as possessing “sovereign, unlimited, and 
unlimitable authority.”371  Governments possessed only that authority 
delegated by the people, Tucker noted, which was in sharp contrast 
to the British theory of legislative omnipotence.372  With the source of 
power established, Tucker questioned whether the Legislature could 
change the constitution without destroying the very foundation of 
their authority.373  As the body charged with expounding laws, 
Tucker continued, the judiciary is obligated “to take notice of the 
constitution, as the first law of the land; and that whatsoever is 
contradictory thereto, is not the law of the land.”374  Endorsing 
judicial power and quoting from The Federalist Papers, Tucker 
described the courts as “‘an intermediate body between the people 
and the legislature’” designed to “‘keep the latter within the limits 
assigned to their authority.’”375  In the performance of their duties, 
courts ascertain the meaning of the constitution “as well as the 
meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative 
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body.”376  But would not such a power place the judiciary above the 
legislative?  According to Tucker, it would not.  Such a power only 
affirms the superiority of the people to both branches.  Consequently, 
the judges must follow the instructions of the people as found in 
fundamental law.377  In following the people’s constitution, Tucker 
agreed with his four colleagues and struck down the statute 
expanding equity jurisdiction as a violation of Virginia’s 
fundamental law.378 
The five opinions present an extraordinary discussion of judicial 
review and should be read by law students prior to a study of 
Marbury.  Writing just ten years after the Treaty of Paris ended the 
Revolutionary War, the Kamper judges all mentioned the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty and how it had been replaced by popular 
sovereignty in Virginia.  With the demise of legislative omnipotence, 
courts were required to “take notice” of the constitution when 
deciding cases and controversies.  Constitutional law was no longer 
reserved for the legislature. 
Properly, there is also a respect for the raw power of judicial 
review.  For example, Judge Tyler articulated the doubtful case rule 
when he declared that the “violation must be plain and clear, or there 
might be a danger of the judiciary preventing the operation of laws 
which might be productive of much public good.”379  This is a 
recognition that the judiciary is also capable of usurpation and that 
judges must be extremely careful when challenging an act of the 
people’s representatives. 
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Although all the Kamper judges endorsed judicial review, we find 
disagreement on the charge of the courts.  Judge Nelson denied that 
courts were the people’s champion and duty bound to sound the 
alarm when the legislature exceeded its powers.380  Judge Tucker, on 
the other hand, believed the courts were duty bound to interpose 
between the people and the legislature to protect the liberties of the 
former from the latter.381  These disagreements aside, both judges 
concurred that courts should strike a legislative act when it is 
contrary to the constitution.382 
8. State v. _________383 
In 1794, the North Carolina Superior Court examined a state 
statute permitting the attorney general to obtain a default judgment 
against receivers of public money.384  Judge Williams sua sponte 
questioned the statute’s validity because provisions in the state bill of 
rights provided that “[n]o freeman ought to be taken, imprisoned or 
disseised of his freehold, liberties or property . . . but by the law of the 
land.”385  The law of the land, according to Judge Williams, required 
that the receivers be provided an opportunity to be heard before a 
jury of their peers.386  The attorney general objected, asserting that 
the state bill of rights did not restrict the legislature as it was directed 
only to foreign powers that might claim a right to interfere with 
North Carolina’s internal government.387 
 
 380. Id. at *4. 
 381. Id. at *22. 
 382. Id. at *5, 23. 
 383. 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 28 (N.C. 1794). For the ease of the reader, pinpoint citations will be to 
the Westlaw citation: 1794 WL 87 (N.C. Super. Ct. Law & Eq. Mar., 1794). 
 384. Id. at *1. 
 385. Id. 
 386. Id. 
 387. Id. at *2. 
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Holding that the bill of rights restricted the legislature, Judge 
Williams rejected the attorney general’s argument.388  In defending 
his authority to void an act of the legislature, Judge Williams noted 
that the people’s representatives were “deputed only to make laws in 
conformity to the constitution, and within the limits it prescribes.”389  
When the legislature exceeds its authority, its “acts are no more 
binding than the acts of any other assembled body.”390  If he did not 
undertake his “duty to resist an unconstitutional act,” the people’s 
liberties would be jeopardized and the constitution overthrown.391  
Refusing to accept defeat, the attorney general asked a two-judge 
panel to reconsider Judge Williams’s ruling.392  Without revealing 
their reasoning, the panel held that the attorney general could 
proceed with default judgments.393 
Although the court did not nullify an act of the legislature, the 
opinion of Judge Williams indicates that such judicial action was not 
beyond the pale in North Carolina.  We find no history lesson on the 
power of Parliament in his opinion, but we do see an emphasis on 
the limitation of the legislature’s power via a written constitution.  
Also implicit in Judge Williams’s opinion is the notion that the 
judiciary is the guardian of the people’s rights as declared in the 
people’s fundamental law.  This combination of factors led him to 
sanction the power of judicial review, but his decision was effectively 
overruled by the panel. 
 
 388. Id. at *1. 
 389. Id. 
 390. Id. 
 391. Id. 
 392. Id. at *3. 
 393. Id. 
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9. Lindsay v. Commissioners394 
Lindsay dealt with the power of eminent domain.  The South 
Carolina General Assembly enacted a statute permitting the 
Charleston City Council to take property to build a new street.395  
The statute did not provide that the owners be paid just 
compensation.396  The owners argued that this lack of compensation 
violated state constitutional provisions providing that a person could 
not be “disseised of his freehold . . . but by the judgment of his peers, 
or by the law of the land.”397  They asked that the judges, “who were 
the constitutional guardians of the rights of the people, to declare this 
act as far as it deprives the owners of their freehold estates without 
compensation, null and void.”398 
The court split evenly over this issue.399  Justices Grimke and Bay 
ruled that the power of eminent domain was vested in the legislature 
and that there was no requirement that an owner receive 
compensation for the taking of his property.400  Justices Burke and 
Waties disagreed, ruling that the owners were entitled to just 
compensation to be ascertained by a jury of their peers.401  Waties’s 
opinion is the most notable of the three for his discussion of judicial 
review. 
Waties stated that “it was painful to him to be obliged to question 
the exercise of any legislative power, but he was sworn to support the 
 
 394. 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 38 (S.C. 1796). For the ease of the reader, pinpoint citations will be to the 
Westlaw citation: 1796 WL 546 (S.C. Const. Ct. App. Oct., 1796). 
 395. Id. at *1. 
 396. See id. 
 397. Id. at *2 (emphasis omitted). 
 398. Id. 
 399. Id. at *13. 
 400. See id. at *11. 
 401. See id. at *12. 
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constitution . . . .”402  Permitting the legislature to violate the 
constitution, Justice Waties noted, subjected the people to mere 
“legislative will.”403  In protection of the people, the court must do its 
“duty, in giving to the constitution an overruling operation over 
every act of the legislature which is inconsistent with it . . . .”404  This 
judicial role provides an “independent security” for the rights of the 
citizenry.405 
Anticipating objections to his opinion, Justice Waties denied that 
his opinion advocated “judicial supremacy.”406  If an act is held void, 
Justice Waties wrote, “it is not because the judges have any control 
over the legislative power, but because the act is forbidden by the 
constitution,” which is the ultimate expression of the people’s will.407 
Although the split in the court prevented an exercise of judicial 
review, Justice Waties’s opinion shares much in common with the 
Kamper opinions.  Justice Waties denied legislative supremacy and 
instead appealed to the people’s ultimate sovereignty.408  The courts, 
to Justice Waties, were protectors of the people’s liberties.409  The 
constitution was a limitation on the legislature’s power, and he had 
no choice but to refer to the constitution when judging the validity of 
a statute.  Because the statute was incongruent with provisions of the 
constitution, Justice Waties would have struck it down.410 
 
 402. Id. at *13. 
 403. Id. 
 404. Id. 
 405. Id. 
 406. Id. 
 407. Id. 
 408. See id. 
 409. See id. 
 410. Id. 
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10. Respublica v. Duquet411 
In 1795, the Pennsylvania legislature delegated to the City of 
Philadelphia the power to prohibit construction of wooden buildings 
in certain parts of the city.412  In 1796, the City passed an ordinance 
pursuant to the state statute.413  Less than a year after the passage of 
the ordinance, Duquet built a wooden structure in the forbidden area 
and was indicted in the mayor’s court.414 
After the case was removed to the state supreme court, Duquet 
challenged the statute as unconstitutional.415  At base, he argued that 
the constitution prohibited a delegation of power to the extent that a 
city could institute prosecutions in the mayor’s court.416  Only the 
State Attorney General as a representative of the sovereign people, 
Duquet argued, could prosecute “general public offenders.”417 
In a short opinion written by Chief Justice Shippen, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court found no impropriety with the city 
prosecuting offenders in the mayor’s court.418  Regarding judicial 
review, the court noted that “a breach of the constitution by the 
legislature, and the clashing of the law with the constitution, must be 
evident indeed, before we should think ourselves at liberty to declare 
a law void.”419  Although the statute in question was constitutional, 
 
 411. 2 Yeates 493 (Pa. 1799). For the ease of the reader, pinpoint citations will be to the 
Westlaw citation: 1799 WL 240 (Pa. 1799). 
 412. Id. at *1. 
 413. Id. 
 414. Id. 
 415. Id. 
 416. See id. at *2. 
 417. Id. 
 418. Id. at *7. 
 419. Id. 
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the court made clear that in the appropriate case it would not “shrink 
from the task of saying such law is void.”420 
The Duquet court embraced judicial review, although it did not 
exercise this power.  The court also articulated the doubtful case rule, 
making clear that it would not strike an act of the legislature except 
for the most grievous violations of the constitution.  In these regards, 
Pennsylvania seemed in line with its sister states on the subject of 
judicial review. 
11. Whittington v. Polk421 
Whittington dealt with a statute reorganizing the Maryland 
judiciary.422  The statute, among other things, removed William 
Whittington as the chief justice of the county courts and replaced 
him with William Polk.423  Whittington challenged the statute as 
unconstitutional because he held his office during good behavior.424 
As typical of other courts reviewing legislative acts, the 
Whittington court began its opinion by noting that the people were 
the source of all power and that the people had delegated to 
government only certain powers.425  It followed that the legislature 
could not be the judge of its own powers because that would 
“establish a despotism.”426  The court observed that the people could 
not police the boundaries of power because they could only be heard 
 
 420. Id. 
 421. 1 H. & J. 236 (Md. 1802). For the ease of the reader, pinpoint citations will be to the 
Westlaw citation: 1802 WL 349 (Md. Gen. Ct. Apr., 1802). 
 422. Id. at *1. 
 423. See id. 
 424. Id. 
 425. Id. at *4. 
 426. Id. 
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during elections.427  But under the constitution, the judiciary was the 
“barrier” established to “resist the oppression” of constitutional 
infringements.428  It thus fell to the courts “to determine whether an 
act of the legislature . . . is made pursuant to” the constitution.429  The 
court admitted that the judiciary might at times fail to properly 
interpret the constitution, but this was no reason to argue against the 
exercise of judicial review.430  According to the court, “the judges are 
liable to be removed from office, on conviction of misbehaviour, in a 
court of law.”431 
Dealing with the statute in question, the court held that justices of 
the county courts served at the pleasure of the governor and could be 
removed at any time.432  The constitution’s good-behavior provision 
applied only to the court of appeals, general court, and admiralty 
court.433  Consequently, Whittington had not been unconstitutionally 
deprived of his office.434 
Noteworthy in the Whittington case is both the unequivocal 
assertion that the courts are the guardians of the people’s liberties, 
and the assumption that the ballot box is an insufficient weapon to 
prevent legislative excesses.435  The court candidly admitted that the 
judicial branch, like the other branches, could usurp constitutional 
power.436 To remedy this, the court saw impeachment as a real threat 
 
 427. Id. 
 428. Id. at *5. 
 429. Id. 
 430. Id. at *6. 
 431. Id. 
 432. Id. at *8. 
 433. Id. 
 434. Id. 
 435. Id. at *4–5. 
 436. Id. at *6. 
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if the judges abused their power of constitutional interpretation.437  
Through impeachment, the people’s representatives could remove an 
offending judge and restore legislative power.438 
12. State v. Parkhurst439 
Parkhurst concerned the constitutionality of a statute providing 
that when any citizen holding a commission under state law accepted 
a position as senator or representative in the United States Congress, 
the commission was deemed vacated.440  Aaron Ogden was the clerk 
of the Essex County Court of Common Pleas and was later elected to 
the United States Senate.441  The clerkship was deemed vacated and 
Jabez Parkhurst accepted the position.442  Ogden challenged the 
constitutionality of the statute, arguing that under the state 
constitution clerks served a five-year term unless impeached.443  
Observing that the term had not expired and he had not been 
impeached, Ogden argued that a mere legislative enactment could 
not trump the terms of the constitution.444 
The State Supreme Court ruled in favor of Ogden, but its written 
opinion has not survived.445  Chief Justice Kirkpatrick issued a 
separate opinion, which has survived, ruling against Ogden on the 
grounds that the office of clerk and senator are incompatible under 
the common law; therefore, acceptance of the second position acts as 
 
 437. Id. 
 438. Id. 
 439. 9 N.J.L. 427 (N.J. 1802). For the ease of the reader, the pinpoint citation will be to the 
Westlaw citation: 1802 WL 1 (N.J. 1802). 
 440. Id. at *4. 
 441. Id. at *1. 
 442. Id. at *2. 
 443. Id. at *12. 
 444. See id. 
 445. See id. at *3. 
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a surrender of the first.446  In dicta, Chief Justice Kirkpatrick 
addressed the argument of Parkhurst that “the constitution itself is in 
the hands of the legislature, and may be altered at pleasure” 
inasmuch as “the legislature are the ultimate judges of the 
constitution.”447 
Chief Justice Kirkpatrick began by defining a constitution as “an 
agreement of the people, in their individual capacities, reduced to 
writing, establishing and fixing certain principles for the government 
of themselves.”448  Describing the people as “supreme in power,” 
Chief Justice Kirkpatrick observed that they had delegated to the 
state legislature only certain defined powers.449  To hold that the 
legislature could alter the constitution would be, in Chief Justice 
Kirkpatrick’s words, “a perfect absurdity” by “making the creature 
greater than the creator.”450  Based on the nature of the constitution, 
state and federal case law endorsing judicial review, and his oath to 
execute his office “agreeably to the constitution,” Chief Justice 
Kirkpatrick concluded that a court could strike an act of the 
legislature.451 
In summary, in the state cases prior to Marbury v. Madison, we 
can discern the development of principles that underpin judicial 
review. Without the context of these early decisions, Marbury can 
easily be misinterpreted. In the early 1780s, judges were reluctant to 
exercise judicial review as demonstrated by Judge Duane in Rutgers 
and Judge Pendleton in Caton.  For many years in England, the 
 
 446. Id. at *13–14. 
 447. Id. at *10. 
 448. Id. 
 449. Id. 
 450. Id. 
 451. Id. at *11–12. 
03__WATKINS.DOC 11/1/2007  3:37:21 PM 
 
VOL. 1 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW &   PUBLIC POLICY 2006 
 
? 244 ? 
judicial power was considered a branch of the executive 
department,452 and this view was accepted by some American 
thinkers.453  After 1776, the states curtailed executive power and 
transferred most of this power to the legislature.454  This, coupled 
with long-standing principles of British constitutionalism, dictated 
that the legislature should be the most powerful branch of 
government.455 Only as principles of popular sovereignty gained 
wider acceptance and understanding did Americans become more 
comfortable with judicial power.456  The reactions to the Rutgers and 
Trevett decisions are prime examples of the early distrust of judicial 
power. 
When courts began to declare acts of the legislature void, they 
based their power on popular sovereignty and the people’s choice to 
limit the power of government via a written constitution.  Hence, 
many of the later opinions (such as Kamper and Lindsay) contain a 
discussion of the history of the Revolution, the powers claimed by the 
British Parliament, and the establishment of popular sovereignty in 
the states.  The power of the people formed the basis of the judges’ 
exercise of judicial review.  With the legislature no longer the 
ultimate sovereign and master of the constitution, courts could take 
notice of the constitution when judging between its terms and the 
terms of a statute.  As a co-equal branch, a court need not bow to 
legislative power, nor was it obligated to assist the legislature in a 
constitutional violation.  The judges’ oath (from Parkhurst) 
 
 452. See supra notes 134–136. 
 453. See M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 151 (Liberty 
Fund 1998) (1967). 
 454. GORDON WOOD, CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1176–1787, at 155 (1969). 
 455. Id. 
 456. This is evident by the series of state judicial review cases cited above. 
03__WATKINS.DOC 11/1/2007  3:37:21 PM 
 
VOL. 1 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW &   PUBLIC POLICY 2006 
 
? 245 ? 
prohibited the courts from turning a blind eye toward legislative 
usurpation. 
Many courts realized that the power of judicial review could be 
abused.  For this reason, several judges articulated the doubtful case 
rule.  Unless the constitutional violation was clear and unambiguous, 
a court should not strike the act of a legislature. In doubtful cases, a 
court should defer to the popular branch.  If a judge declined to 
exercise the doubtful case rule, the Whittington opinion suggested 
that he could be impeached.457  Judicial activism, according to the 
Whittington court, constituted grounds for removal.458 
Because the power of judicial review was based on the court being 
a co-equal branch of government, none of the pre-Marbury cases 
even hint that courts might be the final arbiter of constitutions.  The 
power to take notice of a constitution does not necessarily lead to the 
conclusion that courts, or any other branch taking notice of the 
constitution, have the final say on a constitution’s meaning.  It was a 
big enough step, and a very controversial one early on, for the courts 
to claim equality with the legislature in considering the constitution.  
A claim of judicial supremacy was thus unthinkable and was never 
made. 
D. And Then Came Marbury 
When the Supreme Court decided Marbury v. Madison459 in 
1803, it was not trailblazing.460  As shown above, state courts had 
 
 457. Whittington v. Polk, 1799 WL 240, at *6 (Pa. 1799). 
 458. Id. 
 459. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 460. See 2 GEORGE LEE HASKINS & HERBERT A. JOHNSON, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE UNITED STATES 190 (1981) (“In short, the idea of judicial review was hardly a new one 
when Marbury was decided.  What was new was that the Supreme Court asserted that power, and 
that it did so for the first time in 1803.”); see also David E. Engdahl, John Marshall’s “Jeffersonian” 
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discussed the doctrine of judicial review and exercised a modest form 
of judicial review since the early 1780s.461  Viewed against the 
backdrop of these cases, the reasoning of Marbury becomes clear: the 
Supreme Court, just like Congress and the president, can take notice 
of the Constitution.  Viewed contextually, it is difficult to discern 
how generations of scholars and judges have cited Marbury for the 
proposition that the Supreme Court is the final arbiter of the 
Constitution—the one branch to which the executive and legislative 
must defer in matters of constitutional interpretation.462  This 
popular interpretation cannot stand up under even moderate 
scrutiny. 
The background to Marbury is well known.  In the late 1790s, the 
Federalist Congress passed the Alien and Sedition Acts, making it a 
crime to criticize the national government and giving President 
Adams the power to deport foreigners based on the president’s 
reasonable suspicion that the foreigner had a secret design against 
the government.463  Outraged at such illiberal measures, the people 
voted Adams and his Congressional majority out of office, giving the 
Republicans a 24-seat majority in the House of Representatives and 
electing Thomas Jefferson to the presidency.464  Prior to leaving 
office, the lame-duck Congress attempted to place as many 
Federalists in office before turning over power to Jefferson and his 
Republican Party by passing the Judiciary Act of 1801465 during the 
 
Concept of Judicial Review, 42 DUKE L.J. 279, 324 (1993) (noting that at the time of the Marbury 
decision, judicial review was already a “long and well established” practice). 
 461. See supra Part IV.C. 
 462. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).  
 463. The Alien and Sedition Acts are discussed in WILLIAM J. WATKINS, JR., RECLAIMING THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 30–54 (2004). 
 464. See id. at 79. 
 465. Judiciary Act of 1801, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89 (repealed 1802). 
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chill of February.466  Among other things, the Act created new circuit 
courts staffed by 16 judges, as well as justices of the peace for the 
District of Columbia.467 
William Marbury was appointed as a justice of the peace by 
President Adams and was confirmed by the Senate, but he failed to 
receive his commission before Jefferson assumed office.468  Bringing 
suit within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, Marbury 
asked for a writ of mandamus ordering Secretary of State James 
Madison to deliver his commission.469  In examining Marbury’s 
claim, the Court framed three issues: (1) whether Marbury had a 
right to the commission, (2) if such a right existed, whether the law 
afforded him a remedy, and (3) if a remedy existed, whether the 
requested mandamus was the proper remedy.470 
In considering the existence of a remedy, the Court recognized 
that some executive functions are purely political and thus not the 
subject of judicial scrutiny.471  “But where a specific duty is assigned 
by law, and individual rights depend upon performance of that 
duty,” the Court reasoned, “it seems equally clear that the individual 
who considers himself injured[] has a right to resort to the laws of his 
country for a remedy.”472  Were this not true, the federal government 
would cease to be a government of laws, and the executive would 
enjoy greater power than the king of Great Britain.473  Because 
 
 466. RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG 
REPUBLIC 15 (1971). 
 467. Id.; NELSON, supra note 193, at 57. 
 468. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 155 (1803). 
 469. Id. at 153–54. 
 470. Id. at 154. 
 471. Id. at 165–66. 
 472. Id. at 166. 
 473. Id. at 163. 
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delivery of the sealed commission was not a political act, the Court 
concluded that Marbury, having been deprived of a vested right, had 
recourse to the courts to seek redress of his injury.474 
Finally, the Court turned to the question of whether it could issue 
a writ of mandamus to Secretary of State Madison commanding him 
to deliver the sealed commission to Marbury.  After a discussion of 
the nature of the writ, the Court observed that its power to issue writs 
of mandamus originated in section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789.475  
The Constitution, however, grants the Supreme Court original 
jurisdiction only “[i]n cases affecting Ambassadors, other public 
Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a state shall be a Party.”476  
In all other cases, the Court has appellate jurisdiction subject to 
congressional regulation.477  Because Article Three mentions nothing 
about issuing writs of mandamus as part of the Court’s original 
jurisdiction, the Court had to consider whether an act of Congress 
could alter original jurisdiction to permit issuance of the writ in cases 
falling within original, rather than appellate, jurisdiction.478 
As so many state courts had done in the two decades prior to 
Marbury, the Supreme Court turned to the first principle of popular 
sovereignty: “That the people have an original right to establish, for 
 
 474. Id. at 168. 
 475. Id. at 173 (stating that, “[t]he act to establish the judicial courts of the United States 
authorizes the supreme court ‘to issue writs of mandamus, in cases warranted by the principles 
and usages of law, to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the 
United States’”).  The “act” to which the Court refers is clearly the Judiciary Act of 1789.  See also 
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 80. 
 476. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 477. Id. 
 478. Arguably, the mention of mandamus in the Judiciary Act did not add to the Supreme 
Court’s original jurisdiction.  See AMAR, supra note 195, at 232 (noting that section 13 of the 
Judiciary Act “simply provided that if and when the Court already had jurisdiction (whether 
original or appellate), the justices would be empowered to issue certain technical writs—in 
particular, writs of prohibition and mandamus”). 
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their future government, such principles as, in their opinion, shall 
most conduce to their own happiness, is the basis, on which the 
whole American fabric has been erected.”479  Recognizing the people 
as ultimate sovereigns, the Court described the people as having 
“original and supreme will.”480  Exercising this supreme power, the 
people created three departments of government with limited and 
defined powers.481  So “that those limits may not be mistaken, or 
forgotten, the constitution is written.”482  Again recognizing the 
majesty of the people, the Court averred that “the constitution 
controls any legislative act repugnant to it.”483  The Court specifically 
denied that Congress could alter the people’s Constitution by a mere 
ordinary act of legislation.484  From this discussion of ultimate 
sovereignty, it naturally followed that “an act of the legislature, 
repugnant to the constitution, is void.”485 
If the Constitution is paramount, then must the courts simply 
follow the direction of the legislature and give effect to its 
enactments?  Such a proposition, according to the Court, was “an 
absurdity too gross to be insisted on.”486  “[O]f necessity,” the Court 
continued, the judiciary must “expound and interpret” the law.487 
Often courts are faced with conflicting statutes, and they “must 
decide on the operation of each” to decide the case or controversy 
 
 479. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176. 
 480. Id. 
 481. See id. 
 482. Id. 
 483. Id. at 177. 
 484. Id. 
 485. Id. 
 486. Id. 
 487. Id. 
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presented.488 Hence, the Court declared that “[i]t is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law 
is.”489  With sovereignty no longer vested in the legislative body, 
“courts are to regard the constitution” when performing their judicial 
duties.490  To do otherwise would “subvert the very foundation of all 
written constitutions” and give the people’s agent, Congress, a power 
greater than the principal.491  It would give the legislature “a practical 
and real omnipotence. . . .”492 
The Court then set about giving examples of its duty to refer to 
the Constitution when adjudicating, specifically discussing 
conditional prohibitions against bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, 
and the levying of duties on exported goods.493  The Court’s clearest 
example dealt with treason.  The Constitution provides that “[n]o 
Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two 
Witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court.”494 
The Court contemplated the question: what if Congress decreed that 
“one witness, or a confession out of court, [was] sufficient for 
conviction, must the constitutional principle yield to the legislative 
act?”495  To give effect to such an enactment, the Court concluded, 
would be a violation of the judges’ oath.496  Although Congress might 
violate its oath by attempting to alter the law of treason by mere 
 
 488. Id. at 177–78. 
 489. Id. at 177. 
 490. Id. at 178.  At a later point in the opinion, the Court says that the Constitution must be 
“looked into” when adjudicating an issue.  Id. at 179. 
 491. Id. at 178. 
 492. Id. 
 493. Id. at 179. 
 494. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3. 
 495. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 179 (emphasis added). 
 496. Id. at 179–80. 
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statute, nothing required judges to join in the violation.497  Hence, 
Congress’s attempt to alter original jurisdiction by statute failed and 
the Court refused to issue the writ of mandamus.498 
Marbury did not tread on virgin territory when it grounded its 
authority in the people’s will as manifested by the Constitution. In 
fact, it was simply the federal version of Kamper.  Both cases 
examined whether an act of the legislature could expand court 
jurisdiction in the face of a clear constitutional provision to the 
contrary.  Judges in both cases reached the same result. Although in 
Kamper we are treated to five separate opinions with more in-depth 
reasoning on what was a novel issue at the time, and the court went 
so far as to put the judiciary on par with the legislative branch.  
However, neither Kamper nor Marbury declared the court greater 
than the legislature. 
Viewed in its proper context, the holding in Marbury falls far 
short of radical.  The modesty of Marbury is borne out by 
contemporary reaction to the opinion. Although Jefferson’s 
Republicans and Marshall’s Federalists believed themselves to be in a 
battle for the survival of republicanism in America,499 the Republican 
newspapers expressed little hostility toward the opinion.500  James 
Madison, the defendant in the case, paid even less attention to the 
decision or its ramifications, failing to write a single word about the 
decision.501 Jefferson’s objections to the opinion were grounded in 
Marshall’s “extra-judicial” criticism of Jefferson’s decision to deny 
 
 497. Id. 
 498. Id. at 180. 
 499. See generally, WATKINS, supra note 463, at 79–82. 
 500. See ELLIS, supra note 466, at 66. 
 501. See Jack N. Rakove, Judicial Power in the Constitutional Theory of James Madison, 43 
WM. & MARY L. REV., 1513, 1513 (2002). 
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Marbury his right to the commission (issues one and two discussed 
in the opinion).502  The fact that Jefferson and fellow Republicans 
failed to criticize the Court’s discussion of judicial review is a strong 
indicator that there was little or no disagreement on this third point 
of the opinion. 503 
It must be remembered that Jefferson was a champion of the 
people and the principles of popular sovereignty, which denied the 
legislature the exclusive right to interpret or modify the 
Constitution.504  His reasoning was similar to the reasoning of the 
many state judges who had weighed in on the subject: Jefferson 
believed all three branches of government could interpret the 
Constitution.  Hence, his muted reaction is logical.505 
Jefferson’s theory of constitutional interpretation is best 
explained in his September 11, 1804 letter to Abigail Adams.  In 
responding to Mrs. Adams’s criticism of Jefferson’s decision to 
pardon the men convicted under the Sedition Act, Jefferson averred 
 
 502. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Johnson (June 12, 1823), in THE COMPLETE 
JEFFERSON, at 321 (Saul K. Paldove ed., 1943); see also HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 460, at 193 
(noting that the first portions of the Marbury opinion were “probably more important” to the 
Court than the judicial review section). As Charles F. Hobson, the editor of THE PAPERS OF JOHN 
MARSHALL (Charles F. Hobson et al. eds., 2002), has noted: “For nearly a century after the 
decision, Marbury was almost always cited in connection with issues of original jurisdiction and 
mandamus, not as authority to pronounce laws unconstitutional.”  Charles F. Hobson, John 
Marshall, the Mandamus Case, and the Judiciary Crisis, 1801–1805, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 289, 
289 (2003).   Akhil Amar has also observed that “not until the late twentieth century did the Court 
begin to describe itself as the ‘ultimate interpreter’ of the Constitution.”  AMAR, supra note 195, at 
215. 
 503. But see HASKINS & JOHNSON, supra note 460, at 195–96 (positing that “Jefferson’s failure 
immediately to condemn the Marbury opinion should in no way be read as signifying his initial 
acceptance of its reasoning or to suggest an easing of tensions between the President and the 
Chief Justice. It may well be that Jefferson remained silent about the opinion at the time it was 
rendered not only because he had ‘won’ the case, insofar as the denial of Marbury’s commission 
was concerned, but also because he astutely perceived that raising a controversy over the decision 
could only harm his primary effort to strengthen the Republican party for the approaching 
election.”). 
 504. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Johnson, supra note 502, at 322. 
 505. See infra text accompany notes 506–516. 
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that “nothing in the Constitution has given [the judges] a right to 
decide for the Executive, more than the Executive to decide for them” 
on the constitutionality of the Sedition Act.506  Alluding to principles 
of separation of powers, Jefferson observed that both branches “are 
equally independent in the sphere of action assigned to them.”507  
Although he believed that the Sedition Act was unconstitutional, he 
conceded that “[t]he judges, believing the law constitutional, had a 
right to pass a sentence of fine and imprisonment, because the power 
was placed in their hands by the [C]onstitution.”508  Likewise, “the 
Executive, believing the law to be unconstitutional, was bound to 
remit the execution of it.”509  Jefferson summed up his understanding 
of the Constitution as follows: 
That instrument meant that its co-ordinate branches should be 
checks on each other.  But the opinion which gives to judges the 
right to decide what laws are constitutional, and what not, not 
only for themselves in their own sphere of action, but for the 
legislature and executive also in their spheres, would make the 
judiciary a despotic branch.510 
Jefferson realized that the co-ordinate braches would occasionally 
disagree on matters of constitutional interpretation, particularly 
when controlled by different parties.511  Rather than any one branch 
having the power to decide for the others, he envisioned the people 
would make the final decision, acting through the ballot box or in 
convention.512 
 
 506. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams (Sept. 11, 1804) in 1 THE ADAMS-
JEFFERSON LETTERS, at 279 (Lester J. Cappon ed., 1959). 
 507. Id. 
 508. Id. 
 509. Id. 
 510. Id. 
 511. See id. at 280. 
 512. See id. 
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In Jefferson’s draft of his first annual message to Congress, he 
explained his departmentalist theory in a manner similar to his 1804 
letter to Mrs. Adams.  After discussing his response to the Sedition 
Act, he stated that the Constitution “has provided for it’s [sic] own 
reintegration by a change of persons exercising the functions of those 
departments.”513  To Jefferson, this is exactly what happened in the 
1800 election (Revolution of 1800): “the Revolution of 1800 was as 
real a revolution in the principles of our government as that of 1776 
was in its form; not effected indeed by the sword, as that, but by the 
rational and peaceable instrument of reform, the suffrage of the 
people.”514 
As early as 1783, Jefferson believed that a convention of the 
people was the proper body to settle disputes of interpretation.  In his 
1783 draft of a constitution for Virginia, Jefferson provided that any 
two branches of the government by a two-thirds vote in each branch 
could summon a constitutional convention for altering or correcting 
breaches of the constitution.515  Forty years later, Jefferson continued 
to believe that the people acting in convention were the final arbiters 
of the constitution.516 
Because the High Court’s Marbury opinion neither ran afoul of 
Jefferson’s departmentalist theory nor called into doubt the 
sovereignty of the people, the decision was not a threat to Jefferson 
and the Republicans.  Marbury simply announced the 
departmentalist doctrine: the Court, as well as the other branches, 
 
 513. See DAVID N. MAYER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 270 
(1994) (discussing and quoting the draft message). 
 514. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Judge Spencer Roane (Sept. 6, 1819) in 10 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, at 140 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1910). 
 515. See JEFFERSON, supra note 191, at 221. 
 516. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Johnson, supra note 502, at 322. 
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possesses the power to interpret the Constitution.  Without the 
historical context, modern Americans do not grasp the evolution of 
the doctrine of sovereignty, its importance to our Revolution, and the 
early formation of judicial review in the 1780s.  Because it has not 
been understood in its proper context, Marbury has become a 
decision the stands for something far greater than its modest holding.  
For decades American lawyers have been told that the Marbury 
Court declared itself the final authority on the Constitution, 
although, as shown, this is not an accurate description of the 
Marbury decision.  Inculcation of this point, coupled with 
observation of present practice in which the Court is the final say on 
the Constitution, explains why the importance and meaning of 
Marbury continues to be overstated. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
The divine right of kings, although antedating the Stuarts, will 
forever be associated with James I and his descendents. As did Bodin 
in République, the Stuarts contended that the king was God’s 
lieutenant on earth and beyond the control of any earthly body.  If 
the king violated natural or positive law, his subjects could only 
politely remonstrate and take solace that God would punish the king 
in the afterlife. The king’s subjects could not take active measures to 
protect their rights and liberties. 
During the 1600s, Englishmen challenged the king’s claim that 
ultimate sovereignty resided in the monarch’s royal person. This was 
an expensive challenge resulting in the English Civil War and ending 
with the Glorious Revolution.  In the turmoil of the late 1640s, 
Englishmen debated the first principles of society and some voices 
argued for principles of popular sovereignty to replace divine right 
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theory. Under Leveller theory, departments of government were but 
agents of the people and could only exercise delegated powers with 
the consent of the people.  To put theory into practice, the Levellers 
created the Agreement of the People, which was a written 
constitution whereby the people, as ultimate sovereigns, delegated 
certain powers to their representatives in Parliament.  Such a theory 
was ahead of its time, and a form of it was eventually adopted in the 
constitutions of independent American states in the 1770s. 
Rather than replacing divine right theory with popular 
sovereignty, the Glorious Revolution of 1688 laid the foundation for 
parliamentary sovereignty.  By the 1760s, it was settled that 
Parliament, in the words of Blackstone, possessed an “absolute 
despotic power” that was uncontrollable. Parliament could modify 
the constitution or the statutes of the realm at will.  Neither the king, 
nor the law courts, nor the people could override the actions of 
Parliament. 
The American colonists challenged parliamentary sovereignty 
with the Revolution.  Originally, the Americans argued that ultimate 
sovereignty resided in each state legislature.  But as the Americans 
reflected more on the doctrine of sovereignty, they reached 
conclusions similar to that of the Levellers. Ultimate power could not 
reside in one person such as the king or an artificial body such as 
Parliament.  Sovereignty resided in the people. Only the people could 
possess what Bodin or Blackstone would recognize as sovereignty.  
While the people’s agents (such as, representatives, governors, and 
judges) often exercise great power, this power is derived from the 
people and is therefore inferior to the people’s ultimate sovereignty. 
The American theory of popular sovereignty had a profound 
effect on the power of the courts. Under the British system, 
Parliament was the master of statutory and constitutional law.  
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Courts did not have the power to compare a parliamentary 
enactment with the courts’ understanding of the constitution.  
Judicial review did not exist.  With the establishment of the people as 
the sovereign, the three branches of government became co-equal 
agents of their common master.  In performing their constitutional 
duties, all three branches were bound to interpret the constitution.  
No one branch was all powerful.  Unaccustomed to reviewing acts of 
legislation, some courts continued to defer to the legislature as if it 
were still sovereign.  By the early 1790s, courts were more 
comfortable with “taking notice” of the constitution.  The much 
vaunted Marbury decision was simply a federal chapter in this story 
of American judicial review. 
Today, Marbury is cited for the proposition that the Supreme 
Court is the final arbiter of the Constitution. This interpretation 
divorces Marbury from its historical roots and grossly overstates the 
holding of that case.  Whereas popular sovereignty provides clear 
support for the doctrine of judicial review, it provides no support for 
judicial supremacy.  Popular sovereignty explicitly rejected the 
proposition that a mere branch of government had the final word on 
fundamental law.  Unlike judicial review, judicial supremacy is not 
an outgrowth of popular sovereignty. Instead, it is a regression to an 
older theory of sovereignty that existed prior to the American 
Revolution.  Judicial supremacy places the Supreme Court in the 
position of Parliament. Having the final word in constitutional 
interpretation, the Court can make or unmake any law as it sees fit. 
Other than a very difficult amendment process, the people can do 
nothing to control it. 
Judicial supremacy actually poses a greater danger to the people 
than a system of parliamentary sovereignty.  At least members of the 
House of Commons are subject to popular elections.  The Supreme 
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Court is not subject to this check nor are most of the courts of last 
resort on the state level.517  Impeachment, as suggested by the 
Whittington court, is seldom used and provides no real check on 
judicial authority.  To the extent Americans still adhere to popular 
sovereignty, perhaps they should reconsider Jefferson’s proposal 
found in his 1783 draft of a constitution for Virginia as the proper 
method for settling conflicts between co-equal branches of 
government.  Such an appeal to the people is consistent with the 
principles of our Revolution and would restore co-equal status to the 
three branches of government. 
 
 517. See Larry C. Berkson & Seth Andersen, Judicial Selection in the United States: A Special 
Report (American Judicature Society, 1999) (noting that only 21 “states hold elections for judges 
on courts of last resort”). 
